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This article explores transformations in international law with respect
to collective nonstate entities, challenging the mainstream view that
international law stipulates rights and obligations directly binding on such
entities only on an exceptional basis. Through the example of the U.N.
Charter’s regime for international peace and security, this article
demonstrates the normative change within international law to address
rights and obligations to collective nonstate entities directly, without the
interposition of any state. The article argues that the normative inclusion of
collective nonstate entities within binding international law may be
conceptualized and explained as involving the operation of a “functional
threshold.” Specifically, only the functionally critical collective nonstate
entities, i.e., entities perceived as indispensable for the performance of the
legal regime’s function, have acquired direct rights and obligations under
international law.
I. INTRODUCTION
Collective nonstate entities (CNEs) are neither estab-
lished by nor directly or indirectly derived from states. In addi-
tion to business corporations, nongovernmental organizations,
armed groups, and political opposition groups, this category
includes entities such as humanitarian organizations, advocacy
groups, international terrorist networks, secessionist groups,
and indigenous peoples.1 Much writing has been produced on
international law’s expanding engagement with CNEs and the
various nonbinding and informal ways in which international
law regulates such entities’ conduct.2 Yet, leading general
1. These entities are typically referred to in international legal practice
and scholarship as “non-state actors.” However, this term suffers from critical
imprecision, as it sometimes encompasses individuals and entities directly
emanating from states or states’ collective action, such as international orga-
nizations, informal formations of states, sub-units of federal states, state or-
gans, state agencies, and organs and other bodies of international organiza-
tions. This article employs “collective nonstate entities” as a more precise
term to refer only to collective entities (to the exclusion of individuals) that
do not emanate from states (to the exclusion of international organizations
and other formations of states).
2. See generally NON-STATE ACTORS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Andrea Bi-
anchi ed., 2009) (providing a selection of key writings on the topic of “non-
state actors” and international law); ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLI-
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works on international law have regularly portrayed CNEs as
principally outside binding international law’s3 direct regula-
tory purview but for a few exceptional cases.4 Indeed, main-
stream international legal doctrine has largely considered the
direct binding regulation of CNEs legally impossible or nonex-
istent in positive law, particularly in relation to obligations.5
However, the reality is that CNEs possess many more rights
and obligations under contemporary international law than we
have been led to believe.
Since the early 1990s, the U.N. Security Council (Security
Council, Council, or SC) has used Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter to impose direct obligations upon various nonstate en-
tities, such as rebel groups, political leadership groups, mili-
tias, and terrorist organizations.6 States have not challenged
this practice, and when presented with the opportunity in the
Kosovo advisory opinion, the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) did not question the Security Council’s competence to
GATIONS OF NON-STATE ACTORS (2006) (examining the legal protections
against “the threats to the enjoyment of human rights . . . from non-state
actors”); NON-STATE ACTORS AS STANDARD SETTERS (Anne Peters et al. eds.,
2009) (assessing non-state actors’ role in shaping the international processes
of standard setting); PARTICIPANTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM
(Jean d’Aspremont ed., 2011) (featuring a collection of contributions that
explore the role and status of “non-state actors” from the perspective of “a
particular theory or tradition of international law, a region, an institutional
regime, or a particular subject-matter”).
3. Binding international law involves international legal rights and obli-
gations, i.e. strict entitlements and duties, that are legally binding (obliga-
tory as opposed to optional) as a matter of international law. Both main-
stream positivist and critical scholarship would likely consider the adjective
“binding” superfluous: For the former, it goes without saying that interna-
tional law is binding. For the latter, questions of formal legal validity and
legally binding character are of little consequence. However, the expression
emphasizes the focus of the present query. This article therefore uses “bind-
ing international law” as a benchmark and as a lens of inquiry. The term is
not intended to anthropomorphize international law, but rather to insert
space between states and international law as a normative system.
4. E.g., MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1–2, 156, 193–98 (8th ed.
2017); JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 105–16 (9th ed. 2019); JAN KLABBERS, INTERNATIONAL LAW 84–89
(2013); INTERNATIONAL LAW 228–33 (Malcolm Evans ed., 5th ed. 2018); JEF-
FREY DUNOFF, INTERNATIONAL LAW 169–91 (4th ed. 2015).
5. See infra Part II.
6. See infra Part III.
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do so in any way.7 Armed opposition groups have been ad-
dressees of obligations under customary humanitarian law and
humanitarian law treaties,8 and they have been called to re-
spect fundamental human rights—norms originally designed
to define the limits of state authority vis-à-vis persons within its
jurisdiction.9 International courts have held that news publish-
ers, business entities, advocacy groups, and various other orga-
7. Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403 (July
22) (including no discussion of the Security Council’s competence) [herein-
after Kosovo Advisory Opinion].
8. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick of Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3314, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (Common article 3 to the Geneva Conventions);
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Re-
lating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Proto-
col I), Dec. 12, 1977, 1125  U.N.T.S. 3 (assuming that the armed opposition
group would qualify as a “national liberation movement”); Protocol Addi-
tional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Noninternational Armed Conflicts (Protocol II),
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609; Convention for the Protection of Cultural
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict art. 19, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S.
216; Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, Mar. 26, 1999, 2253
U.N.T.S. 172; Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Cer-
tain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injuri-
ous or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137;
Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E), Decision on Prelim-
inary Motion Based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment), ¶ 22 (May
31, 2004), http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/CDF/Appeal/131/
SCSL-04-14-AR72(E)-131.pdf [https://perma.cc/YK9E-2SZC] (“[I]t is well
settled that all parties to an armed conflict, whether states or non-state ac-
tors, are bound by international humanitarian law, even though only states
may become parties to international treaties.”).
9. E.g., Institut de Droit International, L’application du droit interna-
tional humanitaire et des droits fondamentaux de l’homme dans les conflits
armés auxquels prennent part des Entités non étatiques ¶ 2 (1999) (Belg.),
translated in INST. INT’L L., THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITA-
RIAN LAW AND FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS, IN ARMED CONFLICTS IN WHICH
NON-STATE ENTITIES ARE PARTIES ¶ 2 (1999) (“[A]ll parties in armed conflicts
in which non-State entities [defined as ‘parties to internal armed conflicts’]
are parties, irrespective of their legal status . . . have the obligation to respect
international humanitarian law  as  well  as  fundamental  human  rights.”);
Liesbeth Zegveld, Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups in Interna-
tional Law 97–132 (2002); Int’l. L. Ass’n.: The Washington Conference
(2014), Third Report Prepared by the Co-Rapporteurs, Cedrik Ryngaert and Jean
d’Aspremont, 5–6; CLAPHAM, supra note 2, at 271–312.
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nizations have rights under human rights treaties.10 Airlines
have rights and obligations under air transportation and avia-
tion treaties, such as the E.U.-U.S. Open Skies Agreement,11
while operators of nuclear installations and shipowners are lia-
ble for damage caused by their activities under numerous civil
liability treaties, such as the Vienna Convention on Civil Liabil-
ity for Nuclear Damage12 and the International Civil Liability
Convention for Oil Pollution Damage.13 Corporations operate
alongside states on the deep seabed within the framework of
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), assuming
a plethora of environmental, technology transfer, and other
international law obligations.14 Furthermore, the 2008
10. E.g., Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, App. No. 6538/74, 2 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 245 (1979) (finding that the actions taken against the Sunday Times
violated multiple rights the newspaper possessed under the European Con-
vention on Human Rights, such as the freedom of expression under article
10); Ligue du Monde Islamique v. France, App No. 36497/05 & 37172/05,
(2009) (finding that France’s refusal to allow two religious organizations to
sue a newspaper in French courts violated their rights under article 6 of the
European Convention on Human Rights).
11. United States European Union Air Transport Agreement, Apr. 30,
2007, 46 I.L.M. 470 (including the rights of  airlines to operate flights, carry
transit traffic, and establish offices in the parties’ territory in articles 3 and
10 and the obligation for aircraft to comply with laws on admission, depar-
ture, operation, and navigation in article 7); Case C-366/10, Air Transp.
Ass’n of America v. Sec’y of State for Energy and Climate Change, 2011
E.C.R. I-13755, ¶¶ 82, 84.
12. Article II(1) of the Convention states that the “operator of a nuclear
installation shall be liable for nuclear damage upon proof that such damage
has been caused by a nuclear incident – (a) in his nuclear installation; or (b)
involving nuclear material coming from or originating in his nuclear installa-
tion . . . .” “Operator of a nuclear installation” is defined in art. I(1)(a)-(c) to
include any “partnership” and “any private or public body whether corpo-
rate or not.” Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, May
21, 1963, 1063 U.N.T.S. 265.
13. Article III(1) of the Convention provides that shipowners “at the time
of an incident [of oil discharge from vessel], or, where the incident consists
of a series of occurrences, at the time of the first such occurrence, shall be
liable for any pollution damage caused by the ship as a result of the inci-
dent.”). The “owner” is defined in article I(2)–(3) to include any “partner-
ship” and “any private or public body whether corporate or not.” Interna-
tional Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 29, 1969,
973 U.N.T.S. 3.
14. Article 137(1) of UNCLOS stipulates for example that “No State shall
claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part of the Area or
its resources, nor shall any State or natural or juridical person appropriate any
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ECOWAS Supplementary Act requires investors and their local
corporate vehicles to conduct environmental and social im-
pact assessments and comply with extensive social impact, la-
bor, human rights, and corporate governance requirements.15
Scholarship has principally sought to accommodate nor-
mative phenomena involving CNEs from outside the para-
digms of international law or binding law.16 However, even
when international law is conceptualized narrowly as state-
made law,17 CNEs operate in contemporary international law
as both holders of rights and bearers of obligations. As the
above examples make apparent, states, international organiza-
tions, as well as international and municipal courts and tribu-
nals, and other stakeholders to international legal processes
have treated certain CNEs as possessing both rights and obliga-
tions under treaties, customary international law and secon-
part thereof . . . 3. No State or natural or juridical person shall claim, acquire
or exercise rights with respect to the minerals recovered from the Area ex-
cept in accordance with this Part.” United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (emphases added); see Responsibil-
ities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect
to Activities in the Area, Advisory Opinion, Case No. 17, Order of Feb. 1,
2011, 17 ITLOS Rep. 10 (discussing obligations and responsibility of states
and nonstate entities under UNCLOS Part XI); Case C-308/06, Int’l Ass’n of
Indep. Tanker Owners (Intertanko) v. Sec’y of State for Transp., 2008 E.C.R.
312, ¶¶ 63–64 (distinguishing addressees of Part XI from the other parts of
UNCLOS).
15. Article 14(2) of the ECOWAS Supplementary Act states that “Inves-
tors shall uphold human rights in the workplace and the community in
which they are located. Investors shall not undertake or cause to be under-
taken, acts that breach such human rights. Investors shall not manage or
operate the investments in a manner that circumvents human rights obliga-
tions, labour standards as well as regional environmental and social obliga-
tions, to which the host State and/or home State are Parties.” Article 14(4)
provides that “Investors shall act in accordance with fundamental labour
standards as stipulated in the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles
and Rights of Work, 1998.” Articles 12, 15, and 17 contain similar “shall”
formulations. Supplementary Act A/SA.3/12/08 Adopting Community
Rules on Investment and the Modalities for Their Implementation with
ECOWAS, ch. 3 (Dec. 19, 2008), https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/inter-
national-investment-agreements//3266/download [https://perma.cc/
PG4K-PN5H].
16. See infra Part II.
17. Traditional approaches to international law regularly posit that inter-
national legally binding rules originate only from states and derivatively
from inter-governmental organizations, with states determining both the
content of specific rules and the sources in which these rules may be found.
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dary acts of international organizations directly without the in-
terposition of any state.18 In other words, international law di-
rectly governs CNEs in diverse contexts and applies to them
directly, not through any state or municipal law.
There is thus an apparent disconnect between main-
stream international legal doctrine and the actual practice of
international law with respect to CNEs. However, because rele-
vant practice has normative value in international law, the exis-
tence and increasing occurrence of CNEs possessing direct
international legal rights and obligations impacts both the
content and structures of binding international law. The main-
stream international law doctrine must accordingly be revised
to properly acknowledge the normative inclusion of CNEs as
addressees of rights and obligations under international law.
This article explores the phenomenon of international le-
gal rights and obligations of CNEs through the example of the
law of international peace and security, and in particular the
practice of the U.N. Security Council. Security Council prac-
tice presents a suitable case study, as the Council is a focal
point of international law development19 and regularly deals
with international matters involving CNEs.20 Through analysis
of Security Council practice, this article demonstrates that,
while it is possible for CNEs to have direct rights and obliga-
18. The term “interposition” refers to the question of who holds the
right or obligation, i.e., whether it is the entity itself or whether it is a right
or obligation of some state. Anne Peters refers to a similar idea as “media-
tion,” invoking the German concept of “Mediatisierung.” ANNE PETERS, BE-
YOND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW, 61 n. 6 (Jonathan Huston trans., 2016).
19. See generally Vera Gowlland-Debbas, The Functions of the United Nations
Security Council in the International Legal System, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTER-
NATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 277 (Michael Byers ed., 2001) (discussing the Security Council’s “collec-
tive and institutionalized mechanisms for the enforcement of international
legal norms . . .”); George Nolte, The Limits of the Security Council’s Powers and
its Functions in the International Legal System: Some Reflections, in THE ROLE OF
LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 320, 324–25 (Michael Byers ed., 2001) (discussing the Se-
curity Council’s law-making role); JAMES CRAWFORD, International Law as an
Open System, in International Law as an Open System: Selected Essays 1, 21
(James Crawford ed., 2002) (noting how the Security Council “regularly ad-
dresses injunctions to all sorts of bodies, opposition groups, and even indi-
viduals, using the language of international rights and obligations.”).
20. See infra Part III.
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tions under positive international law, international law is se-
lective in its direct regulation of CNEs: only certain CNEs ac-
quire only certain international legal rights and obligations,
and only in certain circumstances. In order to explain this se-
lectivity, this article introduces the concept of the functional
threshold. This article argues that rights and obligations of
CNEs develop in response to specific matters of international
concern when states consider particular entities to be function-
ally critical, i.e., indispensable to a legal regime’s function of
providing the necessary normative framework to realize the re-
gime’s purpose. The normative inclusion of CNEs among ad-
dressees of binding international law is thus based on the
shared perception that the conduct of particular CNEs either
critically disrupts or facilitates the regime’s function.
This article does not claim that only binding international
law matters.21 Nor does it maintain that binding law is inher-
ently the most preferable regulatory tool for international co-
ordination in matters involving CNEs. Rather, by focusing on
binding international law, this article magnifies one aspect of
the highly complex normative reality of CNEs.22 Binding inter-
national law fundamentally structures and shapes practice in
the international domain and the relationships therein be-
cause of its established structures of recognition, invocation,
and enforcement. This article thus examines whether interna-
tional law has changed not only in terms of its nonbinding
norms but also on the level of binding rules.
Rules are only the beginning of the story; “questions of
implementation, compliance, effectiveness, and enforcement”
are equally important and inherently follow.23 However, it is
21. The normative and regulatory capacity of nonbinding rules as well as
informal law and practices are well-documented. See, e.g., Monica Hakimi,
The Jus ad Bellum’s Regulatory Form, 112 AM. J. INT’L L. 151 (2018) (discuss-
ing informal regulation in the Security Council practice in the area of jus ad
bellum).
22. Somewhat paradoxically, the gap in scholarship has been not in the
absence of alternative normative frameworks but precisely in relation to the
most classical aspect of international law: international rules and interna-
tional legal rights and obligations. However, just as the exclusive focus on
binding law to the exclusion of other normativities results in reductionist
insights regarding the legal processes in the international arena, so too does
the programmatic marginalization of binding international law.
23. ALAN BOYLE & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 38 (2007).
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precisely the logically preceding question of the existence of
CNEs’ direct rights and obligations in international law, and
the lack of literature clearly establishing this existence, that
has caused much unnecessary difficulty. Continued doubts
about the permissibility and existence of international legal
rights and obligations of CNEs have clouded the application of
international law, including by municipal courts, and compli-
cated the use of binding international law as a regulatory tool
for dealing with matters of international concern involving
CNEs.24 Establishing binding international law as a generally
available tool for direct regulation of CNE’s may therefore as-
sist with some of the ongoing revisions of international legal
frameworks relating to the activities of CNEs, such as the Inter-
national Labour Organization (ILO)’s “Decent Work in
Global Supply Chains” agenda currently under considera-
tion.25
The vast majority of international legal scholarship deal-
ing with CNEs in binding international law has considered the
topic from the perspective of the doctrine of subjects (or per-
sonhood) of international law. Literature has accordingly re-
volved around the question of whether or not CNEs—or a par-
ticular category of CNEs—may be considered subjects of inter-
national law.26 The reason for this approach has been the
24. See, e.g., Duncan Hollis, Why State Consent Still Matters—Non-State Ac-
tors, Treaties, and the Changing Sources of International Law, 23 BERKELEY J.
INT’L L. 137, 174 (2005) (arguing that “[w]ithout a better understanding of
international law as ‘law’ . . . , analyses of compliance and effectiveness may
lack a firm foundation.”).
25. The ILO has identified its dominantly indirect regulation of employ-
ers as inadequate for the realities of global supply chains and is looking for
regulatory alternatives. Unfortunately, the formulation of such alternatives
so far seems to lack sophistication. See Int’l Lab. Off., Report IV: Decent
Work in Global Supply Chains, ILO Doc. ILC.105/IV, at 65–68 (2016) (iden-
tifying normative options for closing governance gaps in global supply
chains).
26. See, e.g., Christian Walter, Subjects of International Law, in MAX PLANCK
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2007)
(listing a number of CNEs as “atypical subjects of international law.”); Ruth
Wedgewood, Legal Personality and the Role of Non-Governmental Organizations
and Non-State Political Entities in the United Nations System, in NON-STATE AC-
TORS AS NEW SUBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: INTERNATIONAL LAW—FROM
THE TRADITIONAL STATE ORDER TOWARDS THE LAW OF THE GLOBAL COMMU-
NITY 21, 36 (Rainer Hofmann & Nils Geissler eds., 1998) (examining the
international legal personality of NGOs and “non-state political entities”);
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underlying belief that, unless an entity is a subject of interna-
tional law, it cannot possess international legal rights and obli-
gations. However, studying CNEs through the prism of legal
subjectivity has not been very fruitful.27 The subjects doctrine
has practically served as a conceptual barrier preventing any
substantive inquiry into CNEs in binding international law.28
This article therefore takes a different approach, analyzing
CNEs from the perspective of rules, rights and obligations.
Part II of this article discusses the conventional narrative
regarding CNEs in binding international law. This narrative
perpetuates the mainstream view that CNEs generally cannot
have direct rights and obligations under international law,
thereby excluding such entities from the legal and conceptual
framework. Part III subsequently demonstrates, in technical le-
gal detail, the existence of both direct rights and obligations of
CNEs in positive international law through an examination of
Security Council practice. Part IV analyzes the observed dy-
namic and dynamism underpinning the emergence of direct
rights and obligations of CNEs in international law and
presents a new theoretical framework to explain the mecha-
nism of the normative inclusion of CNEs among the address-
ees of binding international law. The article concludes by dis-
cussing broader legal and policy implications of the state prac-
tice of treating CNEs as having direct rights and obligations
under international law, arguing that mainstream interna-
Patrick Dumberry, L’entreprise, sujet de droit international? Retour sur la question
à la lumière des développements récents du droit international des investissements, in
REVUE GÉNÉRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 103–22 (2004) (exploring
the question whether a corporation may be a subject of international law);
Pieter Kooijmans, The Security Council and Non-State Entities as Parties to Con-
flicts, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF
ERIC SUY 333 (Karel Wellens ed., 1998) (considering the “position of non-
state parties to internal conflicts” under international law).
27. See, e.g., Jan Klabbers, (I Can’t Get No) Recognition: Subjects Doctrine and
the Emergence of Non-State Actors, in NORDIC COSMOPOLITANISM: ESSAYS IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAW FOR MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI 351, 369 (Jarna Petman & Jan Klab-
bers eds. 2003) (arguing that it is “unlikely that subjects doctrine will come
to accommodate non-state entities without further ado.”).
28. ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
HOW WE USE IT 49 (1995); Vaughan Lowe, Corporations as International Actors
and International Law Makers, 14 ITALIAN Y.B. INT’L L. 23, 26 (2004); Klab-
bers, supra note 27 at 353, 367; Andrew Clapham, Focusing on Armed Non-State
Actors, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ARMED CON-
FLICT 768–69 (Andrew Clapham & Paola Gaeta eds., 2015).
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tional law doctrine must be revised to properly acknowledge
the normative inclusion of CNEs within binding international
law.
II. THE CONVENTIONAL NARRATIVE: EXCLUDING COLLECTIVE
NONSTATE ENTITIES FROM BINDING
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Despite the prominence of many CNEs in matters of in-
ternational concern and in international legal phenomena,
the conventional narrative concerning these entities in bind-
ing international law has predominantly been one of exclu-
sion: Mainstream thought has refused to acknowledge CNEs as
possible or actual addressees of rules of international law, con-
sequently excluding CNEs and their actions from binding in-
ternational law’s purview.29
The conventional narrative maintains that, because CNEs
cannot be considered subjects of international law, they can-
not have direct rights and obligations as a matter of course. If
states wish to regulate the conduct of these entities in a legally
binding manner, they must do so indirectly, by committing to
each other either to enact particular municipal laws or to take
other measures, such as administrative decisions, within their
own jurisdictions. Any international regulation of CNEs is
therefore accomplished through a “conception of representa-
tion.”30 Exceptions for specific, individually-recognized non-
state entities, such as the Holy See, the Order of Malta, and
29. Supra note 4; WADE MANSELL & KAREN OPENSHAW, INTERNATIONAL
LAW: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 40–42 (2d ed. 2019); Hersch Lauterpacht,
The Subjects of International Law, in COLLECTED PAPERS OF SIR HERSCH LAUTER-
PACHT 137 (Elihu Lauterpacht ed., 1970); JAMES CRAWFORD, CHANCE, ORDER,
CHANGE: THE COURSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 192–211 (2014); Cedric Ryn-
gaert, Non-State Actors: Carving out a Space in a State-Centred International Legal
System, 63 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 183, 191 (2016); OLIVIER DE SCHUTTER, THE
ACCOUNTABILITY OF MULTINATIONALS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN EU-
ROPEAN LAW 3 (2004). But see Restatement (Third) Foreign Rel. L. U.S. pt. 2
(Am. Law Inst. 1987) (noting that “individuals and private juridical entities
can have any status, capacity, rights, or duties given them by international
law or agreement.”).
30. CRAWFORD, supra note 19, at 27 (explaining that international law in-
volved an exclusive concept of representation, signified by the Mavrommatis
formula, according to which “[w]here individuals were affected by the ac-
tions of other states, it was really the rights of the claimant’s state that were
affected”).
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recognized insurgents and belligerents, can be accommo-
dated, but are merely anomalies.31
While the mainstream international law doctrine has
shifted to recognize international organizations and individu-
als as addressees of certain rules of international law, the con-
ventional narrative regarding CNEs still flows from the classic
positivist conception of international law as principally inter-
state law. Under this formulation, only states and state-like en-
tities can hold rights and bear obligations directly. Although
other entities can potentially participate in and influence in-
ternational legal processes, including lawmaking, international
law does not—and cannot—confer rights or obligations di-
rectly upon them.
Much of the discussion relating to CNEs has consequently
revolved around arguments of legal impossibility. Interna-
tional law or its particular elements, such as the doctrines of
subjects and sources, have not been considered flexible
enough to accommodate CNEs within the binding regulatory
framework.32 Some commentators have acknowledged the ca-
pacity of international law to bestow direct rights and impose
obligations on CNEs, but they have maintained that, with the
exception of certain rights under international human rights
law and certain obligations under international humanitarian
law, no such rights or obligations exist as a matter of positive
law.33
31. Andrea Bianchi, Looking Ahead: International Law’s Main Challenges, in
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 392, 393 (David Armstrong
ed., 2009).
32. See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 66
(7th ed. 2008) (discussing the issue from the perspective of corporations);
PATRICK DAILLIER, MATHIAS FORTEAU & ALAIN PELLET, DROIT INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC 716 (8th ed. 2009) (discussing the issue from the perspective of “pri-
vate persons”).
33. E.g., MARKOS KARAVIAS, CORPORATE OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 17 (2013); Eric De Brabandere, Human Rights Obligations and
Transnational Corporations: The Limits of Direct Corporate Responsibility, 4 HUM.
RTS. & INT’L LEGAL DISCOURSE 66, 73 (2010); Koen de Feyter, Globalisation
and Human Rights, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN A GLOBAL CON-
TEXT 51, 77 (Felipe Gómez Isa & Koen de Feyter eds., 2009); Nigel Rodley,
Non-State Actors and Human Rights, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 523, 526, 543 (Scott Sheeran & Nigel Rodley
eds., 2014).
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Many authors have therefore considered classical interna-
tional law to be largely inadequate to capture and process the
complex power structures and novel legal phenomena of a
globalized world.34 Scholarship’s dominant conceptual ap-
proaches to changing realities have been to (i) theorize the
new normative phenomena involving CNEs through alterna-
tive normative frameworks, such as transnational law, global
law, global administrative law, and pluralist post-national law;35
or (ii) focus on other types of legal normativity such as soft
law, private (self-)regulation, and informal lawmaking, empha-
sizing the importance of socialization and voluntary compli-
ance.36 In fact, much of the contemporary thinking about in-
ternational governance does not even seem to consider formal
34. See, e.g., Klabbers, supra note 27, at 353–54 (arguing that “interna-
tional law has failed to seriously incorporate non-state actors into its frame-
work” and “can only problematically be applied to activities involving actors
other than states.”).
35. See generally, Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime-
Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25
MICH. J. INT’L L. 999, 1009–10 (2004) (explaining the fragmentation of
global law and its normative implications); Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan
Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation Through Transnational New Gov-
ernance, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 501 (2009) (analyzing non-state actors
role in shaping international regulation through the framework of “Transna-
tional New Governance”); LAW AND LEGALIZATION IN TRANSNATIONAL RELA-
TIONS (Christian Brütsch & Dirk Lehmkuhl eds., 2007) (arguing that
“[l]egalization has transformed . . . the institutions of global governance and
the broader frameworks of agency that enable different actors to participate
and operate in world politics”); Paul Schiff Berman, A Pluralist Approach to
International Law, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 301 (2007) (introducing an analytical
framework for understanding “plural normative centers” based on “on
norm-generating communities—rather than nation-states”); Benedict Kings-
bury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative
Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (2005) (“provid[ing] a survey of major
developments and central questions in the emerging global administrative
law”).
36. See generally, INFORMAL INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING (Joost Pauwelyn,
Ramses Wessel & Jan Wouters eds., 2012) (assessing the impact of the rise of
“informal international lawmaking”); A. Claire Cutler, Private International
Regimes and Interfirm Cooperation, in THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 23 (Rodney Bruce Hall & Thomas Biersteker eds.,
2002) (discussing the “development of private international regimes as insti-
tutionalized manifestations of private authority”); ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A
NEW WORLD ORDER (2004) (explaining how government networks contrib-
ute to global governance).
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international law as a factor structuring interactions within the
international domain.
States have strategically sustained the conventional narra-
tive on CNEs, arguably to maintain their privileged position
and control over binding international law. Still, in certain in-
stances, states and intergovernmental organizations have
treated CNEs as possessing international rights and obligations
directly, without the interposition of any state.
III. DIRECT RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF COLLECTIVE
NONSTATE ENTITIES IN THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
PEACE AND SECURITY
Contemporary practice of international law does not cor-
respond to the conventional narrative on CNEs. The law of
international peace and security and the practice of the U.N.
Security Council demonstrate the existence and operation of
direct international legal rights and obligations of CNEs and
exemplify the normative shift within international law to allow
these entities to possess rights and obligations without the in-
terposition of any state.
A. The Security Council, International Law, and Collective
Nonstate Entities
Since the 1990s, the Security Council has dealt with an
increasing number of matters involving CNEs in the exercise
of its “primary responsibility for maintenance of international
peace and security.”37 The Council’s mandate has also pro-
gressively broadened as the concepts of “peace” and “threat to
international peace and security” have expanded beyond
armed conflicts to include humanitarian, economic, social,
and ecological issues.38 Armed groups, terrorist networks, po-
37. U.N. Charter art. 24.
38. E.g., S.C. Res. 2165, at 3 (July 14, 2014) (declaring humanitarian situ-
ation a threat to international peace and security); S.C. Res. 1540, at 1 (Apr.
28, 2004) (declaring proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weap-
ons, as well as their means of delivery, a threat to international peace and
security); S.C. Res. 1521, at 1–2 (Dec. 22, 2003) (declaring “proliferation of
arms and armed non-State actors, including mercenaries” a threat to inter-
national peace and security); S.C. Res. 748, at 1 (Mar. 31, 1992) (declaring
terrorism a threat to international peace and security); S.C. Res. 1373, at 1
(Sep. 28, 2001) (declaring terrorism a threat to international peace and se-
curity in a Chapter VII resolution); S.C. Res. 2177, at 1 (Sept. 18, 2014) (de-
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litical opposition groups, and other similar entities have fre-
quently been at the root of these matters, and today only a
minority of Security Council acts do not involve the conduct of
CNEs in some respect. Over this period of time, the Security
Council has also undergone a process of legalization39 and has
consequently generated a significant body of practice on the
treatment and operation of CNEs under international law.
Some scholars have questioned the propriety of making
inferences about international law from Security Council acts
because of their factual and contextual uniqueness40 and the
political and essentially executive character of the Council.41
The Security Council is clearly a supremely political body,
tasked with the maintenance of international peace and secur-
ity rather than the maintenance of international law.42 Its legal
claring Ebola outbreak a threat to international peace and security). For
commentary, see e.g., Karel Wellens, The UN Security Council and New Threats to
the Peace: Back to the Future, 8 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. (2003) (exploring the
evolution of the concepts of “peace” and “threat to the peace” in Security
Council practice after the end of the Cold War and the impact of this devel-
opment on several branches of international law); Anne Peters, Article 24, in
THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 761, 784 (Bruno
Simma ed., 3d ed. 2012) (discussing the concept of “threat to the peace”).
See also U.N. President of the S.C., Note dated Jan. 31, 1992 from the Presi-
dent of the Security Council, at 3, U.N. Doc. S/23500 (Jan. 31, 1992) (not-
ing the emergence of new threats to peace after the end of Cold war, which
arise from economic, social, humanitarian and ecological instability).
39. While the Security Council would only rarely refer to international
law explicitly in the early decades of its existence, since the end of the Cold
War it has increasingly employed legal language and characterized issues in
legal terms. Today, the Security Council largely conducts its work through
legal determinations, and it is not afraid to act as an enforcer of law. Wel-
lens, supra note 38, at 30; Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 19, at 288–91 (dis-
cussing the application of law of state responsibility by the Security Council).
40. Nolte, supra note 19.
41. Nico Krisch, Chapter VII Powers: The General Framework, in THE CHAR-
TER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 38, at 1239; Georges
Abi-Saab, The Security Council Legibus Solutus? On the Legislative Forays of the
Council, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE QUEST FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION 23,
24 (Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Marcelo Kohen eds., 2010).
42. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 234 (2001); Wellens, supra
note 38, at 30–31, 50; Christian Henderson, The Centrality of the United Nations
Security Council in the Legal Regime Governing the Use of Force, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW 120, 123 (Nigel
White & Christian Henderson eds., 2013); HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE
UNITED NATIONS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF ITS FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS 735
(1950).
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pronouncements and determinations are thus subordinated to
its primary mandate,43 and the invocation of an alleged viola-
tion of international law often plays only an incidental role in
its overall activity.44 The Council also enjoys broad discretion,
both in deciding what constitutes a threat to international
peace and security and how to respond to such a threat. This
discretion necessarily results in “contingency decisions which
are the outcomes of political activity.”45 However, law is always
applied in a particular factual setting. Even if the Security
Council’s actions might at first glance appear to be random,
ad hoc and discretionary exercises of police powers, the fac-
tual contingency neither diminishes their legal character nor
prevents identification of general trends in the Council’s legal
practice.46 The use of legal arguments indicates the speaker’s
conviction of the relevance of the law to the matter at hand,
and such statements are therefore to be accorded legal mean-
ing.47 Moreover, when a body as politically significant as the
43. While the maintenance of international law and the maintenance of
international peace and security are closely connected, they are not necessa-
rily the same. Terry Gill, Legal and Some Political Limitations on the Power of the
UN Security Council to Exercise its Enforcement Powers under Chapter VII of the
Charter, 26 NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 33, 46 (1995); Wellens, supra note 38, at 32.
44. This can mean, for example, that the Security Council may act when
its members agree that a particular situation endangers international peace
and security, not only when a violation of international law occurs. The two
may but need not coincide. A violation of international law does not auto-
matically amount to endangering the peace, a threat to the peace, or a
breach of the peace and lead to the activation of the Security Council. Con-
versely, when the Security Council determines that a situation threatens in-
ternational peace and security, this does not automatically signify that inter-
national law has been breached. A closer scrutiny of each instance is re-
quired.
45. Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 19, at 288.
46. See id. at 287–88 (arguing that “a legal construction can be made of
Council’s discretionary determinations under Article 39, and the resulting
actions—in other words, of what are in fact random and discretionary exer-
cised of police powers”); Wellens, supra note 38, 47–66 (discussing how Se-
curity Council actions taken in the maintenance of international peace and
security have impacted the content of international law).
47. That said, the absence of Security Council action does not allow for
an inference regarding the Council’s legal views (for example, that the
Council considers a particular action a breach of international law, or in
accordance with international law, or outside of the legal limits of the Coun-
cil’s powers), unless there is an indication to this effect, for example in a
presidential statement or in the recorded statements of Security Council
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Security Council and with such a high procedural bar to adopt
any decision speaks to specific legal issues, its pronouncements
necessarily influence the contours of the relevant legal
norms.48 These pronouncements directly and indirectly affect
the legal positions of states as well as other entities, generate
legal consequences, and make new normative expectations
possible, even outside of the Council’s formal lawmaking pow-
ers.49
International law operates within the Security Council
and its decision making in two basic ways: First, international
law factors into the Security Council’s deliberations and deci-
sions by providing applicable rules to the issues at hand, as
well as legal limits on the Security Council’s actions.50 Second,
members. The politics within the Council fundamentally affect what issues
and situations it will take up, as well as what determinations and measures it
will adopt in response to these issues and situations. The Security Council
must achieve the required majority and avoid the exercise of a veto by any of
the five permanent members to take any substantive action. However, if the
Council acts in a particular manner, it may be inferred that it considers the
action to be within its powers and in accordance with applicable interna-
tional law.
48. See Steven Ratner, The Security Council and International Law, in THE
UN SECURITY COUNCIL: FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE 21ST CENTURY 591,
593–95 (David Malone ed., 2004) (stating that “when the Council does speak
on international law, many actors will listen” and even arguing that “the le-
gal declarations of the Council almost certainly have a greater impact on
international actors than do those of the ICJ”); Hakimi, supra note 21, at 167
(explaining that “the Council’s authority is legally salient”).
49. See Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 19, at 287–88 (arguing that Security
Council practice “engender[s] legal consequences and mak[es] possible
new normative expectations.”); Vera Gowlland-Debbas, Security Council En-
forcement Action and Issues of State Responsibility, 43 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 76
(1994) (arguing that Security Council pronouncements or determinations
made under article 39, “whilst emanating from a political process, have far-
reaching legal consequences, which are determined by the UN, and which
create new legal relationships within the framework of the Charter”); Abi-
Saab, supra note 41, at 25–26 (noting the Council’s power to make binding
determinations in certain cases); Nolte, supra note 19, at 323–24 (discussing
the legal implications of Security Council determinations).
50. For discussion of limits of the Security Council’s powers, see Nolte,
supra note 19, at 315–26; NICHOLAS TSAGOURIAS & NIGEL WHITE, COLLECTIVE
SECURITY: THEORY, LAW AND PRACTICE 281–318 (2013); BOYLE & CHINKIN,
supra note 23, at 229–33; DAVID SCHWEIGMAN, THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECUR-
ITY COUNCIL UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE UN CHARTER: LEGAL LIMITS AND THE
ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 163–204 (2001); Peters, supra
note 38, at 816–17; ERIKA DE WET, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CHAP-
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international law is a product of the Security Council’s work in
the form of prescriptions, interpretations, endorsements, and
enforcement of international law.51 Expressed in more techni-
cal terms, the Security Council engages in the creation, appli-
cation and enforcement of international law by declaring the
existence of a particular international legal right or obligation,
by characterizing particular conduct as lawful or unlawful, by
invoking or endorsing a particular rule of international law, by
imposing sanctions for violations of international law, etc. The
Security Council thus specifically (A) creates new international
legal rights and obligations through its binding decisions; and
(B) develops international law through its binding and non-
binding acts (i) by interpreting and applying existing interna-
tional law, both treaty and customary, and (ii) by contributing
to the formation of new customary international law, both as a
relevant forum for the practice of states and possibly on its
own.52
Analysis of the Security Council’s legal practice with re-
spect to binding international law is challenging in that only
some of its resolutions are formally legally binding—decisions
in the strict sense—while other acts are merely nonbinding
TER VII POWERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 137 (2004); Abi-
Saab, supra note 41, at 24–25. Compare these writings with Gabriel Oosthu-
izen, Playing the Devil’s Advocate: The United Nations Security Council is Unbound
by Law, 12 LEIDEN J. INT’L. L. 549–63 (1999).
51. This is an adapted classification of Steven Ratner. Ratner, supra note
48, at 591. For general discussions of the Security Council’s lawmaking pow-
ers, see e.g., Krisch, supra note 41; Peters, supra note 38, at 787; BOYLE &
CHINKIN, supra note 23, at 109–16; Nolte, supra note 19, at 320, 324–25.
52. See, Ratner, supra note 48 (discussing the Security Council’s engage-
ment with international law); Kiel Delbrück, Article 25, in THE CHARTER OF
THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 38, at 409 (explaining that
in 1945, the creation of a binding decision-making power for the organiza-
tion and the Security Council was a core element of the concept of the
United Nations Organization); Rosalyn Higgins, The Development of Interna-
tional Law by the Political Organs of the United Nations 59 PROC. AM. SOCIETY
INT’L L. ANN. MEETING (1921-1969) 116, 117 (1963) (discussing that the po-
litical organs of the U.N. provide a clear forum for the individual as well as
collective practice of states and contribute to the clarification and develop-
ment of law). On the issue of whether Security Council practice may contrib-
ute to the formation of customary law, see G.A. Res. 73/203, annex, Identifi-
cation of Customary International Law, Conclusion 4(2) (Dec. 20, 2018).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYI\53-1\NYI102.txt unknown Seq: 19 30-DEC-20 13:03
2020] THE FUNCTIONAL THRESHOLD 89
recommendations.53 Further complicating the analysis, the le-
gally binding quality of a decision does not hinge on any spe-
cific procedure of adoption or any formal elements. In the
Namibia Advisory Opinion, the ICJ specifically rejected an ar-
gument that for a Security Council resolution to be legally
binding, it must contain an explicit invocation of Chapter VII
of the U.N. Charter.54 Instead, the ICJ stated that the binding
effect must be determined in each case individually, “having
regard to the terms of the resolution to be interpreted, the
discussions leading to it, the Charter provisions invoked and,
in general, all other circumstances that might assist in deter-
mining the legal consequences of the resolution.”55 Although
the Security Council’s drafting practices have been inconsis-
tent and have changed over time to facilitate political com-
promises, its resolutions have nevertheless evinced a rather
formulaic language. In particular, the Council seems to have
developed a normative spectrum in its contemporary practice,
at the very end of which are resolutions of unequivocally le-
gally binding nature. These resolutions include a determina-
tion of the existence of a threat to or breach of international
peace and security; an explicit reference to Chapter VII; and
commanding verbs, such as “decides” or “demands,” which evi-
dence that the Council has taken a decision within the mean-
ing of Article 25 of the U.N. Charter.56
53. Presidential statements and presidential press statements are not le-
gally binding. Stefan Talmon, The Statements by the President of the Security
Council, 2 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 448, 453 (2003). Additionally, the same SC
resolution may contain different types of legal acts, i.e., both decisions and
recommendations. For a full discussion, including the interplay between res-
olutions adopted under Chapter VII and those adopted under Chapter VI of
the U.N. Charter, see Peters, supra note 38, at 793.
54. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council
Resolution 276, Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. Rep. 16, ¶ 114 (June 21)
[hereinafter South West Africa Advisory Opinion]. The U.N. Secretariat takes
the same view. 2003 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 538–39, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.C/41.
55. South West Africa Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, ¶ 114.
56. For discussion, see Michael Wood, The Interpretation of Security Council
Resolutions, Revisited, 20 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. ONLINE 1, 14 (2017); John
Bellinger, The Security Council Resolution on Syria: Is it Legally Binding?,
LAWFARE (Sept. 28, 2013), https://www.lawfareblog.com/security-council-res
olution-syria-it-legally-binding [https://perma.cc/6HFB-H6XM]. Note that
when interpreting Security Council resolutions on Kosovo in the Kosovo Advi-
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Creating or altering legal rights and obligations is only
the smaller part of the Security Council’s legal role. More sig-
nificant is the effect of the Council’s practice on existing inter-
national law and the formation of customary international law.
Consequently, the Council’s formally nonbinding acts have no
less importance than its binding decisions in establishing the
current state and development of international law.57
B. Collective Nonstate Entities as Addressees of Binding
International Law in Security Council Resolutions
Security Council acts are primarily directed at U.N. mem-
ber states and the other organs of the United Nations—most
frequently the Secretary-General. However, the Security Coun-
cil acts, including its binding decisions, may also address other
entities: all states, including non-member states, other interna-
tional and regional organizations, individuals and, since the
end of the Cold War and with increasing frequency, CNEs.58
To provide a representative cross-section of the Security
Council’s treatment of CNEs under its decisions and binding
international law more broadly, this section explores four par-
ticular items on the Council’s agenda: Angola (1992-2002);
Kosovo (1998-2001); the conflict in Syria (2012-2018); and the
nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Despite their
complexity, these matters clearly demonstrate the existence of
direct international legal rights and obligations of CNEs as a
matter of positive law, and they disclose a discernible pattern
and dynamic in the Council’s treatment of CNEs.
sory Opinion, the ICJ considered even softer “calls on” language to have bind-
ing effect. Kosovo Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403, ¶ 116.
57. For legal declarations of existing rights and obligations—in contrast
to the formulation of new rights and obligations—it arguably matters little
whether the relevant resolution was adopted under Chapter VI or VII of the
Charter.
58. In addition to the resolutions cited below, see, e.g., S.C. Res. 942
(Sept. 23, 1994) (Bosnia and Herzegovina); S.C. Res. 1034 (Dec. 21, 1995)
(Bosnia and Herzegovina); S.C. Res. 1355 (Jun. 15, 2001) (Congo); S.C. Res.
2136 (Jan. 30, 2014) (Congo); S.C. Res. 2296 (Jun. 29, 2016) (Sudan and
South Sudan); S.C. Res. 2480 (Jun. 28, 2019) (Mali); SECURITY COUNCIL RE-
PORT, SPECIAL RESEARCH REPORT NO. 1: SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION UNDER
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The determination of whether a Security Council act di-
rectly addresses a CNE is a question of interpretation. The
proper method for interpreting Security Council acts has been
the subject of debate because of the political character of the
body and its working methods.59 In addition to the specific
institutional features of the Council, the text of an act might
not be drafted by lawyers, and the quality of the drafting may
be affected by time pressure (though in most cases the lan-
guage of the resolutions is the result of detailed negotia-
tions).60 Ambiguity is frequently considered a virtue rather
than a flaw, as it facilitates the formation of compromise and
consensus.61 Different Council members with different
“groups of friends” may take leadership in the drafting as
“penholders,”62 making comparisons across acts relating to dif-
ferent agenda items difficult. Most of the negotiating and
drafting history is confidential and the public record generally
embodies any compromise already reached.63 Above all, inter-
pretation is a fundamentally hermeneutic process determined
by the characteristics and limitations of language.64
Nevertheless, a certain consensus on the general method
of interpretation of Security Council resolutions has devel-
59. Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 19, at 288.
60. Wellens, supra note 38, at 20–21; Wood, supra note 56, at 11–13.
61. Michael Byers, Agreeing to Disagree: Security Council Resolution 1441 and
Intentional Ambiguity, 10 GLOB. GOVERNANCE 165 (2004); Wood, supra note
56, at 11–13; Christian Henderson, International Measures for the Protection of
Civilians in Libya and Côte d’Ivoire, 60 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 767, 771 (2011).
62. Teresa Whitfield, Groups of Friends, in UN SECURITY COUNCIL IN THE
21ST CENTURY 491, 491-505 (Sebastian von Einsiedel, David Malone, &
Bruno Stagno Ugarte eds., 2015); SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT, THE PEN-
HOLDER SYSTEM. RESEARCH REPORT (2018), https://www.securitycouncilre-
port.org/atf//%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Pen
holders.pdf [https://perma.cc/5T8Q-GXTD].
63. Indeed, the Security Council President regularly opens the Council’s
formal meetings by referring to “the understanding reached in prior consul-
tations”. See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 2991st mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2991 (May
30, 1991); U.N. SCOR 5608th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5608 (Dec. 22,
2006); U.N. SCOR 6249th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6249 (Dec. 21, 2009);
U.N. SCOR 7083d mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7083 (Dec. 16, 2013); U.N.
SCOR 8359th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.8359 (Sep. 21, 2018).
64. JÖRG KAMMERHOFER, UNCERTAINTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: A KEL-
SENIAN PERSPECTIVE, 87–138 (2011) (discussing theories of hermeneutics and
language).
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oped.65 The interpretative rules in Articles 31 and 32 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT),66 which
emphasize the ordinary meaning, context, and a treaty’s object
and purpose, provide a starting point, while other factors re-
flecting the unique nature of Security Council resolutions
should also be considered.67 These additional factors include
the particular drafting process of Security Council resolutions,
the character of resolutions as products of a voting process,
the fact that resolutions are binding on all U.N. member states
regardless of their participation in the resolutions’ formula-
tion, statements made by Security Council members at the
time of adoption, other Security Council resolutions on the
same issue, and subsequent practice of relevant U.N. organs
and affected states.68
This method fairly accurately describes how interpreters,
such as the ICJ, other international bodies, states, and individ-
65. Kosovo Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403, ¶¶ 94–100; South West Africa
Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, ¶¶ 89, 114.
66. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, 32, May 23, 1969,
1155 UNTS 331 [hereinafter VCLT].
67. E.g., Wood, supra note 56, at 11–13; Michael Wood, Security Council
Resolution 687 (1991), in CONCEPTUAL AND CONTEXTUAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE
MODERN LAW OF TREATIES 790–808 (Michael Bowman & Dino Kritsiotis eds.,
2018); Nico Krisch, Article 39, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A
COMMENTARY, supra note 38, at 713; Peters, supra note 38, at 798; Wellens,
supra note 38, at 20; Kosovo Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403, ¶ 94; Prosecutor
v. Ayyash, STL-11-01/1, Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Ter-
rorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, ¶ 26
(Special Trib. for Lebanon Feb. 16, 2011). However, note that the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, when considering how
to interpret its statute adopted in SC Res. 827 (1993) (May 25, 1993), made
no reference to the VCLT at any point. Prosecutor v. Tadiæ, Case No. IT-94-
1, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction,
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
68. Kosovo Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403, ¶ 94; South West Africa Advi-
sory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, ¶ 114. Admittedly, this list is relatively unstruc-
tured and intended only to provide demonstrative examples, rather than an
exhaustive methodology. Michael Wood has suggested an interpretative
framework, according to which four factors that should be considered when
interpreting Security Council resolutions: (i) the overall political back-
ground and the particular background of the Security Council action; (ii)
the role of the Security Council under the Charter; (iii) the Security Coun-
cil’s working methods; and (iv) the manner in which the Security Council
resolutions are drafted. Michael Wood, The Interpretation of Security Coun-
cil Resolutions, 2 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 73, 74 (1998).
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ual lawyers naturally work with Security Council resolutions.69
For example, in the Kosovo advisory opinion, the ICJ specifi-
cally considered the question of “for whom the Security Council
intended to create binding legal obligations”70 in Resolution
1244. The Court stated that it needed to proceed on a case-by-
case basis and consider all relevant circumstances, with the lan-
guage serving as an important indicator.71 The Court ulti-
mately identified the resolution’s addressees from the draft-
ing, examining the ordinary meaning of the terms in their
context and with regard to its object and purpose.72
The practice of the Security Council of treating CNEs as
possessing rights and obligations under international law must
be distinguished at the outset from the Security Council’s
practice of targeted sanctions. The Council’s targeted sanc-
tions are often presented as the means through which the Se-
curity Council deals with CNEs because they are designed to
alter the conduct of such entities.73 However, in terms of for-
mal legal technique, the sanctions resolutions create obliga-
tions only for states to adopt certain measures within their do-
mestic jurisdictions in relation to CNEs. The resolutions do
not impose international legal obligations on the targeted en-
tities directly.
69. Cf. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962
I.C.J. Rep. 151, 175–77 (July 20); South West Africa Advisory Opinion, 1971
I.C.J. 16, ¶¶ 107–16; Kosovo Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403, ¶¶ 113–18;
U.N. Secretariat, supra note 54. The ICJ President Schwebel has nevertheless
reportedly maintained that verbatim records of Security Council meetings
need not be scrutinized to correct or confirm the ordinary meaning other-
wise deduced. Wellens, supra note 38, at 20.
70. Kosovo Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403, ¶ 117 (emphasis added).
71. Id.
72. Id. at ¶¶ 95–100, 113–18.
73. For examples of Security Council targeted sanctions resolutions, see
S.C. Res. 1373, ¶¶ 1–2 (Sept. 28, 2001); S.C. Res. 1988, ¶ 1 (June 17, 2011);
S.C. Res. 1989, ¶ 1 (June 17, 2011). See generally, Maria-Lydia Bolani, Security
Council Sanctions on Non-State Entities and Individuals, 56 REVUE HELLENIQUE
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 401 (2003) (discussing the new practice of “smart
sanctions” against “non-state entities and individuals” by the Security Coun-
cil); TARGETED SANCTIONS: THE IMPACTS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF UNITED NA-
TIONS ACTION (Thomas Biersteker, Sue Eckert & Marcos Tourinho eds.,
2016) (presenting an in-depth analysis on the evolution of targeted sanc-
tions and their impact).
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1. Angola (1992–2002)
The Security Council’s approach to the situation in An-
gola elucidates its early practice of normative engagement with
CNEs and the process through which the Council began treat-
ing these entities as addressees of binding international law.
In the earlier years of Angola’s civil war, which began in
the mid-1970s, the Council dealt exclusively with the conflict’s
state-to-state aspects, addressing its resolutions only to the
Angolan government and other states involved—most promi-
nently Cuba and South Africa. However, from the beginning
of the 1990s, following the termination of foreign involvement
in the conflict, the Angolan peace process focused on the rela-
tionship between the government and its main domestic oppo-
nent, União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola
(UNITA).
The Security Council acknowledged UNITA for the first
time in the preamble of Resolution 696 in May 1991, welcom-
ing the forthcoming formal signature of peace accords be-
tween the government of Angola and UNITA.74 Subsequently,
when the implementation of the peace accords did not pro-
ceed as envisaged, the Security Council addressed UNITA in
the next resolution, for the first time in an operative para-
graph, “[u]rg[ing] the Angolan parties to comply” with the ac-
cords.75
After the governing party (MPLA) won the elections held
pursuant to the peace accords in September 1992, UNITA be-
gan to obstruct the implementation of the accords. When
UNITA resumed its military activities, the Security Council
adopted SC Resolution 785, “[s]trongly condemn[ing] such
resumption of hostilities and urgently demand[ing] that such
acts cease.”76 The Council “[c]all[ed] upon” the MPLA and
UNITA “to abide by all the commitments under the peace ac-
cords.”77 It also “[r]eaffirm[ed]” its intention to “hold respon-
sible any party” that refused to join in a reconciliation dia-
74. S.C. Res. 696, at 1 (May 30, 1991) (“Welcoming the decision of the
Government of the People’s Republic of Angola and the National Union for
the Total Independence of Angola to conclude the peace accords for An-
gola . . .”).
75. S.C. Res. 747, ¶ 5 (Mar. 24, 1992).
76. S.C. Res. 785, ¶ 3 (Oct. 30, 1992).
77. Id. ¶ 7.
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logue, and “reiterated its readiness to consider all appropriate
measures under the Charter . . . to secure implementation” of
the peace accords.78 The Council warned UNITA that if it
failed to abide by the peace accords, it would be rejected by
the international community, which would not accept any re-
sults of the use of force.79
As UNITA continued to contest the election result and
the security situation in Angola worsened, the Security Council
continued to “[u]rg[e]”  UNITA and the Angolan government
to implement the peace accords80 and “[d]emand[ed] that
the two parties” observe the ceasefire.81 The Security Council
additionally “[s]trongly condemn[ed] violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law,”82 “call[ed] upon both parties to
abide by their [international humanitarian law] obligations,”83
and imposed several specific demands on UNITA.84 Conclud-
ing that Angola was once again on the verge of a civil war be-
cause of UNITA’s conduct and noting that the already grave
humanitarian situation was further deteriorating,85 the Coun-
cil “[s]trongly condemn[ed] the persistent violations by
78. Id. ¶ 9.
79. Id. at 1.
80. S.C. Res. 793, ¶ 5 (Nov. 30, 1992); S.C. Res. 804, ¶ 5 (Jan. 29, 1993)
81. S.C. Res. 793, ¶ 4 (Nov. 30, 1992); S.C. Res. 804, ¶ 2 (Jan. 29, 1993).
82. See S.C. Res. 804, ¶ 10 (Jan. 29, 1993) (“Strongly condemns violations of
international humanitarian law, in particular the attacks against the civilian
population, including the extensive killing carried out by armed civil-
ians . . .”).
83. Id. See also S.C. Res. 811, ¶ 11 (Mar. 12, 1993) (“Strongly appeals to
both parties strictly to abide by applicable rules of international humanita-
rian law, including unimpeded access for humanitarian assistance to the ci-
vilian population in need”); S.C. Res. 834, ¶ 13 (June 1, 1993) (similar text
as S.C. Res. 811); S.C. Res. 851, ¶ 19 (July 15, 1993) (similar text as S.C. Res.
811)); S.C. Res. 864, ¶ 15 (Sept. 15, 1993) (“Reiterates its appeal to both par-
ties to . . . strictly to abide by applicable rules of international humanitarian
law”).
84. S.C. Res. 804, ¶¶ 11–12 (Jan. 29, 1993) (“Demands that UNITA imme-
diately release foreign nationals taken hostage” and “Strongly condemns at-
tacks against UNAVEM II personnel in Angola, and demands that the Govern-
ment and UNITA take all necessary measures to ensure their safety and se-
curity.”). The Security Council also “reiterat[ed] its readiness to consider all
appropriate measures under the Charter of the United Nations to secure
implementation of ‘the Acordos de Paz’.” S.C. Res. 793, ¶ 7 (Nov. 30, 1992);
S.C. Res. 804, ¶ 18 (Jan. 29, 1993).
85. S.C. Res. 811, at 1 (Mar. 12, 1993); S.C. Res. 834, at 1 (June 1, 1993);
S.C. Res. 851, at 1 (July 15, 1993); S.C. Res. 864, at 1 (Sept. 15, 1993).
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UNITA of the major provisions of the ‘Acordos de Paz’,” and
intensified its demands on UNITA in the subsequent resolu-
tions.86 The Council made determinations of illegality as to
UNITA’s conduct,87 and it repeatedly declared its readiness to
enforce the peace accords.88
In SC Resolution 851, the Council moved from general
statements to a specific elaboration of its enforcement inten-
tions, warning UNITA of an impending arms embargo.89
When UNITA failed to comply with the Security Council’s de-
mands, the Council ultimately “[d]etermin[ed] that, as a re-
sult of UNITA’s military actions, the situation in Angola consti-
tute[d] a threat to international peace and security,”90 and it
established an arms and petroleum embargo on UNITA,91 ex-
plicitly acting under Chapter VII. In imposing the embargo,
the Council specifically cited its “[d]etermin[ation] to ensure
respect for its resolutions and the full implementation of the
‘Acordos de Paz’,”92 and threatened the imposition of further
sanctions against UNITA, such as a trade embargo and travel
restrictions on UNITA personnel.93
The vehemence of Security Council resolutions abated
once direct negotiations between UNITA and the Angolan
government resumed. Explicit “demands” on UNITA disap-
86. S.C. Res. 811, ¶¶ 1–3, 5 (Mar. 12, 1993); S.C. Res. 823, ¶ 4 (Apr. 30,
1993); S.C. Res. 834, ¶¶ 3–5 (Jun. 1, 1993); S.C. Res. 851, ¶¶ 4–6, 9, 15, 17
(July 15, 1993); S.C. Res. 864, ¶¶ 6–8, 11, 14, 16 (Sep. 15, 1993).
87. S.C. Res. 834, ¶ 6 (June 1, 1993) (“Affirms that such occupation [of
certain locations by UNITA] is a violation of the ‘Acordos de Paz’”. . .); S.C.
Res. 851, ¶ 7 (July 15, 1993); S.C. Res. 864, ¶ 9 (Sept. 15, 1993); S.C. Res.
851, ¶ 18 (Jul. 15, 1993) (“Reiterates its strong condemnation of the attack by
UNITA forces, on 27 May 1993, against a train carrying civilians, and reaf-
firms that such criminal attacks are clear violations of international humani-
tarian law . . .”); S.C. Res. 864, ¶ 13 (Sept. 15, 1993) (“Strongly condemns the
repeated attacks carried out by UNITA against United Nations personnel
working to provide humanitarian assistance and reaffirms that such attacks
are clear violations of international humanitarian law . . .”).
88. S.C. Res. 811, ¶4 (Mar. 12, 1993) (“[R]eaffirms that it will consider all
appropriate measures under the Charter of the United Nations to advance
the implementation of the ‘Acordos de Paz’. . .”); S.C. Res. 834, ¶ 8 (June 1,
1993) (identical text as S.C. Res. 811).
89. S.C. Res. 851, ¶ 12 (July 15, 1993).
90. S.C. Res. 864, Part B, at 3 (Sept. 15, 1993).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. ¶ 26.
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peared from the resolutions’ text,94 but when hostilities re-
sumed the Council resolutions again increased in urgency.95
When UNITA failed to comply with its obligations under the
Acordos de Paz, the 1994 Lusaka Protocol,96 and Security Coun-
cil resolutions,97 the Council re-intensified its “demands” on
UNITA98 and strengthened the sanctions regime.99 Acting
under Chapter VII, the Security Council “[s]tresse[d] the
need for UNITA to comply fully with all the obligations set out
in resolution 1127 (1997).”100
SC Resolution 1135, adopted in September 1997, repre-
sented a new milestone in the Security Council’s normative en-
gagement with UNITA. The Council determined the existence
of a threat to international peace and security and, explicitly
acting under Chapter VII,” [d]emand[ed] that UNITA com-
ply” with the obligations the Council previously imposed on
it.101 The Security Council continued treating UNITA as a di-
rect addressee of obligations under its resolutions thereafter,
including explicitly under Chapter VII, setting forth new obli-
gations for UNITA, enforcing previously formulated ones, and
invoking UNITA’s obligations under international humanita-
94. S.C. Res. 890 (Dec. 15, 1993); S.C. Res. 903 (Mar. 16, 1994).
95. S.C. Res. 922 (May 31, 1994); S.C. Res. 932 (June 30, 1994); S.C. Res.
945 (Sept. 29, 1994); S.C. Res. 952 (Oct. 27, 1994); S.C. Res. 966 (Dec. 8,
1994); S.C. Res. 1008 (Aug. 7, 1995); S.C. Res. 1045 (Feb. 8, 1996); S.C. Res.
1064 (July 11, 1996); S.C. Res. 1075 (Oct. 11, 1996); S.C. Res. 1087 (Dec. 11,
1996); S.C. Res. 1098 (Feb. 27, 1997); S.C. Res. 1102 (Mar. 31, 1997); S.C.
Res. 1106 (Apr. 16, 1997).
96. The Lusaka Protocol, signed on November 15, 1994, was another in-
ternationally-sponsored peace agreement between the Angolan government
and UNITA.
97. S.C. Res. 1127, at 1 (Aug. 28, 1997) (“Strongly deploring the failure by
UNITA to comply with its obligations under the ‘Acordos de Paz’ (S/22609,
annex), the Lusaka Protocol and with relevant Security Council resolutions,
in particular resolution 1118 (1997) . . .”).
98. S.C. Res, 1118 ¶ 13 (June 30, 1997); S.C. Res. 1127, .
99. S.C. Res, 1118 ¶ 13 (June 30, 1997); S.C. Res. 1127, ¶¶ 1–3 Part B, ¶
14.
100. S.C. Res. 1130, ¶ 1 (Sept. 29, 1997).
101. S.C. Res. 1135, at 2, ¶ 5 (Oct. 29, 1997) (“Determining that the present
situation constitutes a threat to international peace and security in the re-
gion, . . . Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
Demands that UNITA comply immediately and without any conditions with
the obligations set out in resolution 1127 (1997) . . .”). The Council also
articulated other “demands” on UNITA in this resolution. Id. ¶¶ 3–4.
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rian law, human rights law, and refugee law.102 When the
Angolan government gained the upper hand in the fighting
and in this sense the situation in Angola stabilized, the Coun-
cil ceased addressing UNITA in the operative paragraphs of its
resolutions. While still often acting under Chapter VII, the
Council stipulated obligations only for states and dealt with in-
ternal U.N. arrangements.103 The Security Council ceased be-
ing seized of the matter in December 2002.104
2. Kosovo (1998–2001)
The Security Council first took formal action on Kosovo
on March 31, 1998 through SC Resolution 1160, acting under
Chapter VII. In addition to addressing the government of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Council made several
“calls” on the “Kosovar Albanian leadership” and “all elements
in the Kosovar Albanian community.”105 The Council
“[c]ondemn[ed] acts of terrorism by the Kosovo Liberation
Army [KLA] or any other group” in the resolution’s pream-
ble.106 It also imposed an arms embargo on the Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia, including Kosovo,107 and declared its
readiness to take additional measures in the absence of con-
structive progress toward peaceful resolution of the situa-
tion.108
As the security and humanitarian situations deteriorated,
the Security Council proceeded to adopt unequivocal lan-
guage imposing legal obligations on the CNEs involved. Af-
firming that the situation in Kosovo constituted a threat to in-
ternational peace and security and explicitly acting under
102. S.C. Res. 1149 (Jan. 27, 1998); S.C. Res. 1164 (Apr. 29, 1998); S.C.
Res. 1173 (June 12, 1998); S.C. Res. 1176 (June 24, 1998); S.C. Res. 1180
(June 29, 1998); S.C. Res. 1190 (Aug. 13, 1998); S.C. Res. 1202 (Oct. 15,
1998); S.C. Res. 1213 (Dec. 3, 1998); S.C. Res. 1219 (Dec. 31, 1998); S.C.
Res. 1221 (Jan. 12, 1999); S.C. Res. 1229 (Feb. 26, 1999); S.C. Res. 1237 (May
7, 1999); S.C. Res. 1268 (Oct. 15, 1999); S.C. Res. 1295 (Apr. 18, 2000).
103. S.C. Res. 1336 (Jan. 23, 2001); S.C. Res. 1348 (Apr. 23, 2001); S.C.
Res. 1374 (Oct. 19, 2001); S.C. Res. 1404 (Apr. 18, 2002); S.C. Res. 1412
(May 17, 2002); S.C. Res. 1432 (Aug. 15, 2002); S.C. Res. 1433 (Aug. 15,
2002); S.C. Res. 1439 (Oct. 18, 2002).
104. S.C. Res. 1448 (Dec. 9, 2002).
105. S.C. Res. 1160, ¶¶ 2, 4 and 6 (Mar. 31, 1998).
106. Id. at 1.
107. Id. ¶ 8.
108. Id. ¶¶ 6, 19.
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Chapter VII,109 the Council “[d]emand[ed] that all parties,
groups and individuals immediately cease hostilities and main-
tain a ceasefire in Kosovo,”110 and that “the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Albanian leadership take imme-
diate steps to improve the humanitarian situation.”111 The
Council “[c]all[ed] upon” “the Kosovo Albanian leadership”
and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to enter into a dia-
logue and fully cooperate with the Prosecutor of the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.112 The
Council further “[i]nsist[ed] that the Kosovo Albanian leader-
ship condemn all terrorist action, and emphasize[d] that all
elements in the Kosovo Albanian community should pursue
their goals by peaceful means only.”113 The Council then re-
peated its “demands” on “the Kosovo Albanian leadership” in
October 1998 in SC Resolution 1203, which was also adopted
under Chapter VII.114
Consensus within the Security Council subsequently de-
volved, resulting in the Council adopting only nonbinding SC
Resolution 1239 relating to humanitarian concerns in May
1999.115 However, in the wake of NATO air strikes under Op-
eration Allied Force and in light of the continuing violence
and grave humanitarian and refugee situation, the Security
Council proceeded to adopt SC Resolution 1244, once again
under Chapter VII, through which the U.N. effectively took
control of Kosovo.116 The resolution laid down the framework
for the administration of Kosovo, creating an international
civil presence (the United Nations Interim Administration
Mission in Kosovo, UNMIK) and an international security
presence (the Kosovo Force, KFOR). As to its addressees, SC
109. S.C. Res. 1199, at 2 (Sept. 23, 1998).
110. Id. ¶ 1.
111. Id. ¶ 2.
112. Id. ¶¶ 3, 13. The ICJ deemed these operative paragraphs “demands
addressed eo nominee to the Kosovo Albanian leadership.” Kosovo Advisory
Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403, ¶ 116.
113. S.C. Res. 1199, ¶ 6 (Sept. 23, 1998). Again, the ICJ considered this
paragraph to constitute a “demand” on the Kosovo Albanian leadership. Ko-
sovo Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403, ¶ 116.
114. S.C. Res. 1203, at 2, ¶¶ 4–6, 10–11 (Oct. 24, 1998). Once more, the
ICJ considered these operative paragraphs “demands” on the Kosovo Alba-
nian leadership. Kosovo Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403, ¶ 116.
115. S.C. Res. 1239 (May 14, 1999).
116. S.C. Res. 1244, at 2 (June 10, 1999).
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Resolution 1244 primarily imposed obligations on the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and the U.N. Secretary-General. With
respect to CNEs, the Council “[d]emand[ed] that the KLA
and other Kosovo Albanian groups end immediately all offen-
sive actions and comply with the requirements for demilitariza-
tion,”117 and demand[ed] that the parties cooperate fully in
[the] deployment” of the international civil and security
presences.118
As the situation stabilized, the Security Council subse-
quently adopted only two more resolutions relating to Kosovo.
In SC Resolution 1345, the Council reiterated its support for
SC Resolution 1244, “[d]emand[ed]” the cessation of armed
actions against the governmental authorities, and
“[u]nderlin[ed]” the requirement for “all parties to act with
restraint and full respect for international humanitarian law
and human rights.”119 In SC Resolution 1367, the Council ter-
minated the arms embargo.120
3. Syria (2012–2018)
The Security Council’s engagement with the Syrian con-
flict has been greatly affected by the impending Russian veto,
which initially precluded any legally binding decisions on the
matter. The rare early resolutions involved only nonbinding
appellations, primarily calling on the Syrian government to re-
spect its commitments and agreements, and expressing sup-
port for humanitarian assistance and the U.N. Supervision
Mission (UNSMIS).121 Still, these resolutions also referred to
CNEs. The Council “[c]ondemn[ed] . . . human rights abuses
by armed groups,”122 “[c]all[ed] upon all parties in Syria, in-
cluding the opposition, immediately to cease all armed vio-
lence,”123 and “[c]all[ed] upon the Syrian armed opposition
groups and relevant elements to respect relevant provisions of
117. S.C. Res. 1244, ¶ 15 (June 10, 1999).
118. Id. ¶ 8.
119. S.C. Res. 1345, ¶¶ 3–4, 7 (Mar. 21, 2001).
120. S.C. Res. 1367, ¶¶ 1–2 (Mar. 31, 2001).
121. S.C. Res. 2042, ¶¶ 1–3, 10 (Apr. 14, 2012); S.C. Res. 2043, ¶¶ 1–2,
7–8, 11 (Apr. 21, 2012); S.C. Res. 2059, ¶ 2 (July 20, 2012).
122. S.C. Res. 2042, at 1 (Apr. 14, 2012); S.C. Res. 2043, at 1 (Apr. 21,
2012).
123. S.C. Res. 2042, ¶ 4 (Apr. 14, 2012); S.C. Res. 2043, ¶ 3 (Apr. 21,
2012).
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the Preliminary Understanding.”124 The Council also made a
variety of other “calls” on the CNEs involved, such as to coop-
erate with the U.N. and humanitarian organizations to facili-
tate the provision of humanitarian assistance and guarantee
the safety of UNSMIS personnel.125
The dynamics within the Security Council changed in the
late summer of 2013 with evidence of the use of chemical
weapons in Syria. The Security Council unanimously adopted
SC Resolution 2118, in which it determined that the use of
chemical weapons constituted a threat to international peace
and security and amounted to a “violation of international
law.”126 The Council, “[d]emand[ed]” the Syrian government
and opposition groups not to develop, acquire or use chemical
weapons (and in the case of the nonstate groups also nuclear
and biological weapons),127 and “decid[ed] that all parties in
Syria shall cooperate” with the investigation and the destruc-
tion and verification program of the Organization for the Pro-
hibition of Chemical Weapons.128 The Security Council re-
stated the illegality of chemical weapons and reiterated its de-
mands relating to such weapons in subsequent resolutions.129
After 2014, the majority of the Security Council resolu-
tions dealing with Syria focused on two broad aspects of the
124. S.C. Res. 2043, ¶ 4 (Apr. 21, 2012). This was the case despite the fact
that the opposition groups were not parties to the Preliminary Understand-
ing, which was agreed between the Syrian government and the United Na-
tions. See U.N. Secretary-General, United Nations Supervision Mechanism, U.N.
Doc. S/2012/250 (Apr. 19, 2012).
125. S.C. Res. 2042, ¶¶ 8, 10 (Apr. 14, 2012); S.C. Res. 2043, ¶¶ 9, 11
(Apr. 21, 2012); S.C. Res. 2059, ¶ 2 (July 20, 2012).
126. S.C. Res. 2118, ¶¶ 1–2 (Sept. 27, 2013).
127. Id. ¶¶ 4–7, 19.
128. Id. ¶ 7. The Security Council also “[d]ecid[ed] [that] in the event of
non-compliance with this resolution, including unauthorized transfer of
chemical weapons, or any use of chemical weapons by anyone in the Syrian
Arab Republic, to impose measures under Chapter VII of the United Na-
tions Charter.” Id. ¶ 21.
129. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2209, at 1–2, ¶¶ 1–6 (Mar. 6, 2015); S.C. Res. 2235,
at 1, ¶¶ 1–4, 7 (Aug. 7, 2015); S.C. Res. 2314, at 1, ¶ 2 (Oct. 31, 2016); S.C.
Res. 2319, at 1, ¶ 3 (Nov. 17, 2016). These resolutions did not repeat the
formal determination of a threat to international peace and security; how-
ever, the Security Council declared its readiness to impose Chapter VII mea-
sures in the event of future noncompliance with S.C. Res. 2118 (2013). S.C.
Res. 2209, ¶ 7 (March 6, 2015); S.C. Res. 2235, ¶ 15 (Aug. 7, 2015); S.C. Res.
2314, ¶ 2 (Oct. 31, 2016); S.C. Res. 2319, ¶ 3 (Nov. 17, 2016).
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conflict: its political resolution and the deteriorating humani-
tarian situation. In SC Resolution 2139, in light of escalating
violence and a rising death toll, the Security Council
“[s]trongly condemn[ed] . . . the human rights abuses and vio-
lations of international humanitarian law by armed groups.”130
Although the Council did not explicitly determine the exis-
tence of a threat to international peace and security in the res-
olution, it made a large number of “demands” on “all par-
ties,”131 including to stop all violence and “cease and desist
from all violations of international humanitarian law and viola-
tions and abuses of human rights.”132 In SC Resolution 2165,
adopted in July 2014, the Security Council formally deter-
mined that “the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Syria
constitute[d] a threat to peace and security in the region,” ex-
plicitly referring to Article 25 of the U.N. Charter.133 Identify-
ing “the need for all parties to respect the relevant provisions
of international humanitarian law”134 and “stress[ing] the
need to end impunity for violations of international humanita-
rian law and violations and abuses of human rights,”135 the
Council “[r]eiterate[d] that all parties . . . must comply with
their obligations under international humanitarian law and in-
ternational human rights law and must fully and immediately
implement the provisions of its resolution 2139 (2014) and the
Presidential Statement of 2 October 2013.”136 The Council
also imposed several obligations relating to the facilitation of
humanitarian assistance137 and declared its readiness to take
130. S.C. Res 2139, ¶ 1 (Feb. 22, 2014).
131. Id. ¶¶ 2–6, 8–10, 15; S.C. Pres. Statement 2013/15, ¶¶ 5, 8–9 (Oct. 2,
2013).
132. Id. ¶ 2.
133. S.C. Res. 2165, at 2 (July 14, 2014).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. ¶ 1.
137. Id. ¶¶ 6, 8 (“Also decides that all Syrian parties to the conflict shall
enable the immediate and unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance
directly to people throughout Syria . . . including by immediately removing
all impediments to the provision of humanitarian assistance” and “Decides
that all Syrian parties to the conflict shall take all appropriate steps to ensure
the safety and security of United Nations and associated personnel, those of
its specialized agencies, and all other personnel engaged in humanitarian
relief activities as required by international humanitarian law”).
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further measures in the event of noncompliance “by any Syr-
ian party.”138
The sharp political division within the Security Council
between the Western states, supporting the Syrian opposition
groups, and the Russian Federation, supporting Assad’s re-
gime, prevented the Council from adopting legally binding de-
cisions on the conflict’s political aspects.139 However, the
Council continued to explicitly determine the humanitarian
situation in Syria to constitute a threat to peace and security
and to refer to Article 25 of the Charter in its resolutions deal-
ing with the conflict’s humanitarian aspect.140 The Council ex-
tensively addressed both Syrian opposition groups and the Syr-
ian authorities, specifically “[d]emand[ing]” that all parties
comply with international humanitarian law, international
human rights law, and its earlier acts and allow access for hu-
manitarian convoys.141 The Council also reiterated its readi-
ness to take enforcement action in case of noncompliance “by
any party to the Syrian domestic conflict.”142 In SC Resolution
2401, which the Security Council adopted in response to the
intensification of violence in Eastern Ghoura, Rukhban, and
Raqqa, the Security Council set a number of additional obliga-
138. Id. ¶ 11.
139. S.C. Res. 2254 (Dec. 18, 2015); S.C. Res. 2268 (Feb. 26, 2016); S.C.
Res 2336 (Dec. 31, 2016). Although even in these resolutions, the Council
referred the obligations of “all parties” “under international law, including
international humanitarian law and international human rights law as appli-
cable” S.C. Res. 2254, ¶ 13 (Dec. 18, 2015), S.C. Res. 2268, ¶ 5 (Feb. 26,
2016). Similar formulation may be found in S.C. Res. 2191, ¶ 4 (Dec. 17,
2014).
140. S.C. Res. 2191, at 3 (Dec. 17, 2014); S.C. Res. 2258, at 4 (Dec. 22,
2015); S.C. Res. 2332, at 4 (Dec. 21, 2016); S.C. Res. 2393, at 4 (Dec. 19,
2017); S.C. Res. 2449, at 4 (Dec. 13, 2018). An exception to this pattern was
S.C. Res. 2328 (Dec. 19, 2016), relating to the Asad regime’s siege of Aleppo.
The Council set out its concerns regarding the humanitarian situation, but
the impending Russian veto prevented a formal determination of a threat to
international peace and security.
141. S.C. Res. 2191, ¶ 1 (Dec. 17, 2014); S.C. Res. 2258, ¶ 1 (Dec. 22,
2015); S.C. Res. 2332, ¶¶ 1, 4 (Dec. 21, 2016); S.C. Res. 2393, ¶¶ 1, 4 (Dec.
19, 2017); S.C. Res. 2449, ¶¶ 2, 4, 5 (Dec. 13, 2018).
142. S.C. Res. 2191, ¶ 6 (Dec. 17, 2014). See also S.C. Res. 2258 ¶ 6 (Dec.
22, 2015), S.C. Res. 2332, ¶ 6 (Dec. 21, 2016), S.C. Res. 2393, ¶ 7 (Dec. 19,
2017) and S.C. Res. 2449, ¶ 7 (Dec. 13, 2018) (all reaffirming that the Secur-
ity Council will take further measures under the Charter of the United Na-
tions in the event of non-compliance with the earlier resolutions).
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tions for “all parties.”143 These new obligations included “de-
mands” to cease hostilities; allow humanitarian assistance and
medical and civilian evacuations; demilitarize medical and ci-
vilian facilities; and avoid establishing military positions in
populated areas.144 The Council also “[r]eiterat[ed] its de-
mand” on “all parties”  “to comply with their obligations under
international law,” including international human rights law
and international humanitarian law, and specified the re-
quired protection of civilians, medical and humanitarian per-
sonnel, hospitals, and other medical and civilian facilities.145
In addition to imposing obligations on CNEs, the Syrian
conflict also provides an example of an explicit conferral of
rights upon these entities. The Security Council recognized
the value of humanitarian relief work from its early resolutions
on Syria, “[c]all[ing] on all parties in Syria, in particular the
Syrian authorities,” to cooperate in the provision of humanita-
rian assistance.146 As the humanitarian situation deteriorated
and a political consensus within the Security Council emerged,
the Council imposed several “demands” on “all parties, in par-
ticular the Syrian authorities” to facilitate humanitarian relief
operations, to allow the delivery of humanitarian assistance,
and to provide humanitarian access.147 In SC Resolution 2165,
the Security Council then supplemented the obligations im-
posed on the Syrian state and on the CNEs involved in the
143. S.C. Res. 2401, at 1, ¶¶ 1, 5–6, 8, 10 (Feb. 24, 2018).
144. Id.
145. S.C. Res. 2401, ¶¶ 7–8 (Feb. 24, 2018) (“Reiterates its demand, re-
minding in particular the Syrian authorities, that all parties immediately
comply with their obligations under international law, including interna-
tional human rights law, as applicable, and international humanitarian law,
including the protection of civilians as well as to ensure the respect and pro-
tection of all medical personnel and humanitarian personnel exclusively en-
gaged in medical duties, their means of transport and equipment, as well as
hospitals and other medical facilities . . .” and “Demands that all parties facili-
tate safe and unimpeded passage for medical personnel and humanitarian
personnel exclusively engaged in medical duties, their equipment, transport
and supplies, including surgical items, to all people in need, consistent with
international humanitarian law and reiterates its demand that all parties demili-
tarize medical facilities, schools and other civilian facilities and avoid estab-
lishing military positions in populated areas and desist from attacks directed
against civilian objects”).
146. S.C. Res. 2042, ¶ 10 (Apr. 14, 2012); S.C. Res. 2043, ¶ 11 (Apr. 21,
2012).
147. S.C. Res. 2139, ¶¶ 4–6 (Feb. 22, 2014).
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conflict148 with the explicit conferral of a right,
“authoriz[ing]” the United Nations humanitarian agencies
and their “implementing partners”149 to use routes across con-
flict lines and specified border crossings “in order to ensure
that humanitarian assistance, including medical and surgical
supplies, reaches people in need throughout Syria through
the most direct routes.”150 The Security Council periodically
restated the humanitarian organizations’ right to use the
routes and crossings thereafter.151
4. Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
By 2004, it was widely understood that nonstate entities’
acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) presented
a real danger, and there was a strong political will to address
what was perceived as a gap in the existing nonproliferation
regime.152 In April 2004, the Security Council unanimously
148. S.C. Res. 2165, ¶¶ 6, 8 (July 14, 2014); see also supra note 137 and
accompanying text.
149. The implementing partners have consisted of a number of nongov-
ernmental humanitarian organizations, including the Syrian Arabic Red
Crescent, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and the
Syrian American Medical Society. CHRISTIAN ELS, KHOLOUD MANSOUR & NILS
CARSTENSEN, FUNDING TO NATIONAL AND LOCAL HUMANITARIAN ACTORS IN
SYRIA: BETWEEN SUB-CONTRACTING AND PARTNERSHIPS 4–5, 10–12, 32–33 (Ker-
ren Hedlund ed., 2016).
150. S.C. Res. 2165, ¶ 2 (July 14, 2014) (“Decides that the United Nations
humanitarian agencies and their implementing partners are authorized to
use routes across conflict lines and the border crossings of Bab al-Salam, Bab
al-Hawa, Al Yarubiyah and Al-Ramtha, in addition to those already in use, in
order to ensure that humanitarian assistance, including medical and surgical
supplies, reaches people in need throughout Syria through the most direct
routes, with notification to the Syrian authorities”).
151. S.C. Res. 2191, ¶ 2 (Dec. 17, 2014), S.C. Res. 2258, ¶ 2 (Dec. 22,
2015), S.C. Res. 2332, ¶ 2 (Dec. 21, 2016); S.C. Res. 2393, ¶ 2 (Dec. 19,
2017); S.C. Res. 2449, ¶ 3 (Dec. 13, 2018).
152. U.N. Secretary-General, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility.
Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, ¶¶ 12, 107–44,
U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004); S.C. Res. 1373, ¶ 3 (Sept. 28, 2001);
U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4950th mtg., at 3, 5, 9, 17, 22, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4950
(Apr. 22, 2004); U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4956th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/
PV.4956 (Apr. 28, 2004). See generally, e.g., SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT, CROSS-
CUTTING REPORT NO. 2: THE SECURITY COUNCIL’S ROLE IN DISARMAMENT AND
ARMS CONTROL: NUCLEAR WEAPONS, PROLIFERATION AND OTHER WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION 22–23 (Sept. 1, 2009), https://www.securitycouncilre
port.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/%20
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYI\53-1\NYI102.txt unknown Seq: 36 30-DEC-20 13:03
106 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 53:71
adopted, under Chapter VII, SC Resolution 1540,153 in which
it affirmed that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and bio-
logical weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constituted
a threat to international peace and security.154 The Council
accordingly established an extensive nonproliferation regime
to prevent “non-State actors” from manufacturing, acquiring,
possessing, developing, transporting, transferring, or using
WMDs and their means of delivery.155
Although the objective of the resolution was to inhibit the
conduct of nonstate entities and to counter the international
black market for WMDs, SC Resolution 1540 imposed all obli-
gations only upon states, expanding their existing nonprolifer-
ation obligations to their relations with “non-State actors.”156
The resolution also did not contain any statement on the legal-
ity or illegality of the acquisition, use, and proliferation of
WMDs specifically by nonstate entities, as if international law
did not directly prohibit such nonstate activities.
The Resolution 1540 nonproliferation regime has re-
mained inter-state, without an explicit articulation of interna-
tional law’s prohibition against the use of WMDs and related
conduct by “non-State actors.”157 However, in SC Resolution
2118 on the Middle East, which the Security Council adopted
in reaction to the chemical attack in Ghouta, Syria, the Coun-
cil’s approach changed.158 In the preamble, the Security
September%202009.pdf [https://perma.cc/DK9U-MQZ3]; Jack Beard,
Countering the Threat Posed by Non-State Actors in the Proliferation of Weapons of
Mass Destruction, 92 AM. SOC. INT’L L. PROC. 173, 173 (1998).
153. S.C. Res. 1540 (Apr. 28, 2004).
154. Id. at 1.
155. S.C. Res. 1540 (Apr. 28, 2004).
156. The resolution required states (i) to refrain from providing support
to nonstate entities attempting to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess,
transport, transfer or use weapons of mass destruction; (ii) to adopt and
enforce municipal laws that prohibit nonstate entities from engaging in such
activities; and (iii) to take measures to establish domestic controls. Id.
157. S.C. Res. 1673 (Apr. 27, 2006); S.C. Res. 1810 (Apr. 25, 2008); S.C.
Res. 1977 (Apr. 20, 2011); S.C. Res. 2325 (Dec. 15, 2016); 2016 Comprehen-
sive Review, SECURITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO RESO-
LUTION 1540 (2004), http://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/comprehensive-and-
annual-reviews/2016-comprehensive-review.shtml [https://perma.cc/5MV5-
7MVF] (last visited Nov.13, 2020).
158. The Security Council resolutions on Syria do not explicitly refer to
Chapter VII, but they do contain explicit determinations of a threat to peace
as well as commanding language, such as “decides” and “demands.” It is gen-
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Council referred to resolution 1540159 and “reaffirm[ed]” that
the proliferation of chemical weapons constituted a threat to
international peace and security and their use  amounted to “a
serious violation of international law.”160 Determining the exis-
tence of a threat to international peace and security and refer-
ring to Article 25 of the Charter,161 the Council
“[d]etermin[ed] that the use of chemical weapons anywhere
constitute[d] a threat to international peace and security,”162
and “[c]ondemn[ed] in the strongest terms any use of chemi-
cal weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, in particular the at-
tack on 21 August 2013, in violation of international law.”163
The Council then proceeded to “[d]eman[d] that non-state
actors not develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport,
transfer, or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and
their means of delivery.”164 The Council concluded by expres-
sing readiness to adopt enforcement measures in the event of
“non-compliance with the resolution, including unauthorized
transfer of chemical weapons, or any use of chemical weapons
by anyone in the Syrian Arab Republic.”165
The Security Council thus unambiguously extended the
legal obligations articulated for states in the 1540 regime to
nonstate entities. On the face of SC Resolution 2118, it may
have arguably been unclear whether the Council was creating
new obligations for “non-State actors” not to acquire, use, and
proliferate WMDs, or whether it was simply invoking existing
obligations. However, the better view is that the Council was
erally understood that the absence of a reference to Chapter VII was a politi-
cal concession necessary to avoid a Russian veto, but it does not affect the
binding nature of these resolutions. To compare on-record statements of the
United States, Luxembourg, United Kingdom, Azerbaijan, Republic of Ko-
rea, Argentina, and Australia, which explicitly refer to the binding character
of the resolution, with the statement of the Russian Federation, see U.N.
SCOR, 68th Sess., 7038th mtg. U.N. Doc. S/PV.7038 (Sept. 27, 2013). For
commentary, see Bellinger, supra note 56. For a more measured view, see
Syria: From Stalemate to Compromise, WHAT’S IN BLUE (Sept. 27, 2013), http://
www.whatsinblue.org/2013/09/syria-adoption-of-a-chemical-weapons-resolu-
tion.php [https://perma.cc/2U7R-QYWH].
159. S.C. Res. 2118, at 1 (Sept. 27, 2013).
160. Id. at 1–2.
161. Id.
162. Id. ¶ 1.
163. Id. ¶ 2.
164. Id. ¶ 19.
165. S.C. Res. 2118, ¶ 21 (Sept. 27, 2013).
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both applying the prohibitions on WMDs to CNEs and aug-
menting those prohibitions with its own legally binding de-
mand, thereby creating an additional legal source for the
prohibitions.
The Security Council’s demands on CNEs relating to
WMDs were repeated in various resolutions on the Middle
East: SC Resolution 2209, SC Resolution 2235, and SC Resolu-
tion 2319.166 In SC Resolution 2319, the Security Council fur-
ther “[r]eaffirm[ed] that the use of chemical weapons consti-
tutes a serious violation of international law,” and “reiter-
ate[ed] that those individuals, entities, groups or
Governments responsible for any use of chemical weapons
must be held accountable.”167
C. Observations on Collective Nonstate Entities’ International
Legal Rights and Obligations in Security Council
Practice
The cases of Angola, Kosovo, Syria, and the nonprolifera-
tion of WMDs demonstrate that since the early 1990s, the Se-
curity Council has prescribed new direct rights and obliga-
tions, including explicitly under Chapter VII, for CNEs, in-
cluding armed groups, militias, political factions, opposition
groups, terrorist organizations, and nongovernmental humani-
tarian organizations. In doing so, the Council has employed
linguistic formulations directly addressing the respective CNEs
in an unconditional and mandatory—as opposed to facultative
and aspirational—manner, and has treated these entities as
holding rights and obligations under international law di-
rectly, without the interposition of any state.168 Indeed, as the
law generally applicable to and applied by the Security Council
166. S.C. Res. 2209 (Mar. 6, 2015); S.C. Res. 2235 (Aug. 7, 2015); and S.C.
Res. 2319 (Nov. 17, 2016). Resolution 2319 was a response to the conclusion
of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the
United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism that the Islamic State in Iraq
and the Levant (ISIL) used Sulphur mustard gas in Syria.
167. S.C. Res. 2319, at 1 (Nov. 17, 2016).
168. The interpretation of Security Council resolutions and their individ-
ual provisions both in terms of legal force and in terms of addressees may be
debatable due to the inherent challenges and ambiguities. However, this
conclusion holds even under a restrictive interpretative approach limiting
positive instances of direct rights and obligations to unequivocally legally
binding decisions, which unambiguously address CNEs.
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is international law, the rights and obligations prescribed for
such entities are rights and obligations under international
law.
At the same time, the Security Council has treated CNEs
as having certain existing and preexisting international legal
obligations, commonly invoking such obligations, demanding
compliance with them, and specifying the content of particu-
lar obligations under relevant branches of international law, in
particular international humanitarian law and international
human rights law. The Security Council has also regularly held
CNEs responsible for violations of both the newly imposed and
preexisting obligations by determining particular conduct to
be illegal, condemning noncompliance, and adopting or
threatening to adopt enforcement measures to secure compli-
ance. The Security Council’s normative engagement with
CNEs thus extends well beyond the imposition of targeted
sanctions on such entities through state-addressed measures.
Rather, the Council treats these entities as directly regulated
by binding international law.
The direct regulation of CNEs has not superseded the Se-
curity Council’s overall preference for state-based regulation
and support for strong statehood.169 Security Council resolu-
tions continue to address the majority of their operative
paragraphs to states (and other U.N. organs), and the resolu-
tions’ structure and language show the Council’s continued
distinct treatment of states and CNEs.170
169. The Security Council regularly articulates its commitment to territo-
rial integrity of states in preambles. E.g., S.C. Res. 922, at 1 (May 31, 1994).
However, explicit supporting statements may be identified in operative
paragraphs as well. E.g., S.C. Res. 864, ¶ 5 (Sep. 15, 1993).
170. One frequently noted distinction is that the Council tends to use the
term “human rights abuses” when referring to nonstate entities and “human
rights violations” when referring to states. This difference was allegedly ini-
tially promoted by Amnesty International to position human rights as a pro-
ject of the protection of individuals against states. While some resolutions
indeed make such a distinction, others do not. Compare S.C. Res. 2139, ¶ 1
(Feb. 22, 2014) (referring to “violations of human rights” in relation to the
Syrian government and to “human rights abuses” in relation to the armed
groups), with S.C. Res. 1231, ¶ 3 (Mar. 11, 1999) (referring to “violations of
human rights” in relation to the rebels in Sierra Leone). The distinction
today seems rather inconsequential. See also JESSICA BURNISKE, NAZ
MODIRZADEH & DUSTIN LEWIS, ARMED NON-STATE ACTORS AND INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRACTICE OF THE U.N. SE-
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Substantive obligations of states and CNEs regularly ap-
pear side by side, evidencing that the obligations of states and
CNEs are independent. First, some Security Council resolu-
tions involve instances in which CNEs are treated as possessing
obligations identical in content to those of states, such as to
observe international humanitarian law, to respect a cease-fire,
or to provide humanitarian access.171 In such instances, the
Council either designs or interprets a rule of international law
to address both CNEs and states. Second, in situations involv-
ing conduct unique to CNEs, the Council specifies particular
obligations to apply exclusively to such entities, such as the ob-
ligation to demilitarize or to release hostages, thereby differen-
tiating the international legal rights and obligations of states
and CNEs.172
The practice of imposing new and enforcing existing in-
ternational legal obligations on CNEs is admittedly at odds
with the Security Council’s character as a treaty-based inter-
state mechanism. Arguably, the Security Council’s powers
should be limited to direct regulation of states by the terms of
the U.N. Charter and by the principles of treaty law, in particu-
lar the pacta tertiis rule that treaties can bind only their own
parties.173 CNEs have not consented to the Security Council’s
competence.174 Under the consent-based principles of treaty
law, such entities should therefore only be indirect targets of
Security Council decisions, such as in the context of the Secur-
ity Council’s sanctions regimes. Still, the very language of its
resolutions exhibits the Security Council’s perception of its
own competence over CNEs, although the source of this com-
petence may be difficult to discern.
Scholarship has suggested alternative explanations for the
Security Council’s competence over CNEs, including constitu-
CURITY COUNCIL AND U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY 10 (2017) (analyzing textual
references to international human rights law in relation to armed nonstate
actors in the Security Council and General Assembly practice).
171. See supra Section III.B.
172. See supra Section III.B.
173. VCLT, supra note 66, arts. 35–38.
174. Under the U.N. Charter, it is the U.N. member states who agree to
accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council. U.N. Charter art.
25.
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tionalist views of the Charter175 and the reinterpretation of the
Council’s mandate as a guarantor of international peace and
security on behalf of the international community.176 Most im-
portantly, however, states have not protested against the Secur-
ity Council’s widespread practice of directly addressing CNEs
in its resolutions.177 The Kosovo advisory proceedings,178 in
which more than forty states participated, would have pro-
vided a prime opportunity for objection, as a core issue was
whether SC Resolution 1244 bound the Kosovo Albanian lead-
ership—to whom the ICJ referred as the “authors of the decla-
ration of independence”—and prohibited them from declar-
ing independence. However, none of the participating states
questioned the Security Council’s competence to impose obli-
gations directly on the Kosovo Albanian leadership or other
Kosovar groups, and neither did the ICJ.179 The ICJ ultimately
found that the resolution did not bind the Kosovo Albanian
leadership, given that the resolution did not specifically men-
tion the leadership, in contrast to specifically referring to the
KLA, other armed Kosovo Albanian groups, the U.N. member
states, the U.N. Secretary-General, and the Special Representa-
tive of the Secretary-General for Kosovo.180 However, the
Court noted without any reservation that “it ha[d] not been
uncommon for the Security Council to make demands on ac-
tors other than the United Nations Member States and inter-
175. E.g., Bardo Fassbender, UN Security Council Reform and the Right
of Veto: A Constitutional Perspective (1998); Peters, supra note 38, at 803.
176. Christian Tomuschat, Obligations Arising for States Without or Against
Their Will, 241 RECUEIL DES COURS 195, 266 (1993).
177. On states’ right to protect against the decisions of the Security Coun-
cil and novel types of decision making, see Nicolas Angelet, Protest Against
Security Council Decisions, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE: ES-
SAYS IN HONOUR OF ERIC SUY 277 (Karel Wellens ed., 1998); Peters, supra
note 38, at 784.
178. Kosovo Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403.
179. The only participants in the advisory proceedings suggesting that the
Security Council did not have the authority to set forth obligations for the
Kosovar Albanian leadership were the authors of the declaration of indepen-
dence themselves. However, the leadership took this position to avoid any
applicability of SC Res. 1244 to themselves, in case the ICJ were to interpret
the resolution as prohibiting the declaration of independence.
180. Kosovo Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403, ¶ 115 (“There is no indica-
tion, in the text of the Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), that the
Security Council intended to impose, beyond that, a specific obligation to
act or a prohibition from acting to such other actors.”).
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governmental organizations. More specifically, a number of
Security Council resolutions adopted on the subject of Kosovo
prior to Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) contained de-
mands addressed eo nomine to the Kosovo Albanian leader-
ship.”181 The ICJ thus acknowledged that CNEs may be and
have been bound by Security Council resolutions, and that the
Security Council had the competence to impose both obliga-
tions to act and prohibitions from acting upon such entities.
Even outside of the advisory proceedings, states have not
challenged the Security Council’s practice with respect to
CNEs. In fact, the practice confirming the Security Council’s
power to impose direct obligations on CNEs, as well as the
CNEs’ capacity to be the addressees of such obligations, is
overwhelming.182 While these issues could have originally
181. Id. ¶ 116. The Court gave specific examples of such demands. Id.
(“For example, resolution 1160 (1998) ‘[c]all[ed] upon the authorities in
Belgrade and the leadership of the Kosovar Albanian community urgently to enter
without preconditions into a meaningful dialogue on political status issues’
(resolution 1160 (1998), para. 4; emphasis added). Resolution 1199 (1998)
included four separate demands on the Kosovo Albanian leadership, i.e.,
improving the humanitarian situation, entering into a dialogue with the Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia, pursuing their goals by peaceful means only,
and co-operating fully with the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the former Yugoslavia (resolution 1199 (1998), paras. 2, 3, 6 and
13). Resolution 1203 (1998) ‘[d]emand[ed] . . . that the Kosovo Albanian
leadership and all other elements of the Kosovo Albanian community com-
ply fully and swiftly with resolutions 1160 (1998) and 1199 (1998) and co-
operate fully with the OSCE Verification Mission in Kosovo’ (resolution 1203
(1998), para. 4). The same resolution also called upon the ‘Kosovo Albanian
leadership to enter immediately into a meaningful dialogue without precon-
ditions and with international involvement, and to a clear timetable, leading
to an end of the crisis and to a negotiated political solution to the issue of
Kosovo’; demanded that ‘the Kosovo Albanian leadership and all others con-
cerned respect the freedom of movement of the OSCE Verification Mission
and other international personnel’; ‘[i]nsist[ed] that the Kosovo Albanian
leadership condemn all terrorist actions”; and demanded that the Kosovo
Albanian leadership ‘co-operate with international efforts to improve the hu-
manitarian situation and to avert the impending humanitarian catastrophe’
(resolution 1203 (1998), ¶¶ 5, 6, 10 and 11)”).
182. Indeed, the Security Council inherently revises its powers, including
Chapter VII powers, through its own practice. The limits of the Council’s
powers are accordingly constantly moving in response to situations consid-
ered to constitute “threats to the peace” and in response to the measures
that the Security Council can practically and politically take to maintain or
restore international peace and security. E.g., Bianchi, supra note 31, at 396;
Jacob Katz Cogan, Stabilization and the Expanding Scope of the Security Council’s
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been debated, almost thirty years of states’ uniform acquies-
cence with this sustained practice has turned the issues
moot.183 The Security Council has consequently expanded its
formal lawmaking powers to include the competence to im-
pose obligations and confer rights on states and CNEs alike,
thereby weakening the consent-based conception of its compe-
tencies. As a result, the Council’s practice demonstrates the
existence of direct international legal rights and obligations of
CNEs in positive international law.
IV. NORMATIVE INCLUSION OF COLLECTIVE NONSTATE
ENTITIES AMONG ADDRESSEES OF BINDING INTERNATIONAL
LAW: THE FUNCTIONAL THRESHOLD
In addition to demonstrating the existence of direct inter-
national legal rights and obligations of CNEs in positive law,
the Security Council practice also makes apparent that inter-
national law is selective in its direct regulation of such entities.
Only certain CNEs become addressees of only certain interna-
tional legal rights and obligations, and only in certain circum-
stances. The regulation of CNEs in international law is in this
sense fragmented. This observed selectivity begs the question
as to when such direct rights and obligations emerge and
whether there is an underlying mechanism that explains their
occurrence and the conditions under which they develop, or
whether their emergence is simply ad hoc.
Work, 109 AM. J. INT’L L. 324–339, 325 (2015); Peters, supra note 38, at
800–07; Christian Tomuschat, Article 33, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NA-
TIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 38, at 1082.
183. On acquiescence, see generally I. C. MacGibbon, The Scope of Acquies-
cence in International Law, 31 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 14 (1954); Nuno Sérgio Mar-
ques Antunes, Acquiescence, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW, (2006) (online encyclopedia), https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/
10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-el373?rskey=QXuJrP
&result=1&prd=MPIL; David Bederman, Acquiescence, Objection and the Death
of Customary International Law, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 31 (2010); G.A.
Res. 73/203, supra note 60, Conclusion 10(3) (characterizing acquiescence
as a “[f]ailure to react over time to a practice” that stands side by side with
verbal and physical acts of states as evidence of opinio juris). On the role of
acquiescence in the development of the U.N. system and its capacity of to
remedy even the most obvious illegal acts of the organs, see BENEDETTO CON-
FORTI & CARLO FOCARELLI, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS
43, 54, 69–70, 268, 298–99, 302, 327, 348, 400 (4th ed. 2010).
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Existing international law literature offers only limited
guidance. Peter Kooijmans suggested in the late 1990s that the
Security Council would impose obligations upon CNEs when
the entities were parties to an internationalized peace agree-
ment, because such agreements could confer international le-
gal personality on those entities.184 Anne Peters, on the other
hand, argued that the Security Council directly regulates
armed groups in the context of non-international armed con-
flicts because of lack of state control over those groups.185
However, the Security Council has treated CNEs as direct ad-
dressees of binding international law even in other circum-
stances.186 Additionally, these rationales cannot explain all
dimensions of the observed selectivity, in particular with re-
spect to the content of specific rights and obligations.
Most general considerations of international law’s engage-
ment with CNEs, as well as advocacy calling for direct regula-
tion of particular CNEs,187 have typically emphasized the eco-
nomic, political or social power of CNEs in today’s world rela-
tive to states, communities, and human beings.188 Accordingly,
in those views, it is the size, wealth, or operation in the terri-
tory of multiple states which should warrant an entity’s direct
regulation through binding international law. Upon closer
look, however, the normative inclusion of CNEs among ad-
dressees of binding international law does not depend on the
abstract absolute magnitude of an entity; the dynamic is more
nuanced.
A. Dynamics of Inclusion
Although the Security Council’s treatment of CNEs as ad-
dressees of binding international law has now become wide-
spread, the Council was initially reluctant to address CNEs di-
rectly in its resolutions. Originally designed as a body of and
184. Kooijmans, supra note 26, at 340.
185. Peters, supra note 38, at 802.
186. Consider the example of the Kosovo Albanian leadership (as distinct
from the KLA). See supra Section III.B.2.
187. Consider, for example, the campaign to impose human rights obliga-
tions on transnational corporations.
188. E.g., Sarah Joseph, Taming the Leviathans: Multinational Enterprises and
Human Rights, 46 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 171, 171 (1999); ALICE DE JONGE,
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACCOUNTABILITY IN
THE GLOBAL BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 73 (2011).
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for states, the Security Council has always supported statehood
and the state-centered status quo within the international do-
main. The Security Council has also been hesitant to interfere
in states’ internal affairs. The Council’s practice of prescribing
new legal rights and obligations for CNEs, treating various
CNEs as addressees of existing international law obligations,
and enforcing these rights and obligations, has thus been fun-
damentally cautious and incremental.
This incrementalism has taken place within the context of
individual situations before the Council, with the early exam-
ple of UNITA providing an instructive illustration.189 Even
though UNITA had been the key internal opposition group in
Angola for decades, at first the Security Council did not ad-
dress UNITA in its resolutions on the situation. It was only in
response to the withdrawal of the foreign states involved in the
conflict, the failing of the peace process, UNITA’s resumption
of hostilities, the deteriorating humanitarian conditions of the
local civilian population, the overall destabilization, and the
inability of the territorial state to gain control over the situa-
tion that the Security Council started imposing obligations on
UNITA through its resolutions. The Council then gradually es-
calated its demands vis-à-vis UNITA, imposing new obligations,
invoking additional existing international law obligations, and
enforcing those obligations depending on the circumstances
on the ground. Still, the Security Council’s general reluctance
to acknowledge and directly address CNEs in its resolutions
was apparent even with each additional obligation extended to
UNITA.190
Over time, the Security Council has increasingly dealt
with key CNEs involved in matters on its agenda. It has regu-
larly directly addressed CNEs in its acts, and it has bestowed
rights and imposed a variety of international legal obligations
on such entities. The Council has become more willing to ad-
dress CNEs involved in a situation from the very outset of its
189. See supra Section III.B.2.
190. The Angolan example also illustrates the inherent fluidity and con-
duct-based nature of the normative inclusion of CNEs in binding interna-
tional law. The Security Council would only address UNITA directly when it
considered UNITA’s particular conduct to endanger international peace
and security. As soon as UNITA ceased the relevant conduct, it came out of
the purview of the Security Council’s regulatory activity. See infra Section
III.B.1.
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involvement in a matter.191 This has been the case both in
terms of imposing new obligations, including explicitly under
Chapter VII, and invoking existing international legal obliga-
tions, especially when the Council had previously extended
those obligations to CNEs in the context of other matters.192
Nonetheless, the Security Council has continued to favor
an individualized, situation-specific determination of which
CNEs will be treated as addressees of its resolutions. The
Council has not adopted any “legislative” resolution that
would impose new obligations on collective nonstate entities
generally, outside of the context of a particular situation.193 As
illustrated by the example of nonproliferation of WMDs, the
Council has been unwilling to impose general nonprolifera-
tion obligations on CNEs, as many states perceive the imposi-
tion of such general obligations as excessive interference in
states’ internal affairs.194 Instead, the Council only explicitly
articulated a prohibition against the development, acquisition
and use of WMDs by CNEs for the first time in the situation-
specific context of the Syrian conflict.195
Moreover, the significance of the nonstate conduct in
matters on the Council’s agenda has led to shifts in the Coun-
191. E.g., S.C. Res. 2071 (Oct. 12, 2012) (involving Mali).
192. The Security Council practice leading to the introduction of direct
rights and obligations has been quite spontaneous, with the determination
of particular entities as functionally critical being reflected in the Council’s
actual conduct. However, international law assigns legal relevance and inten-
tionality to these spontaneous acts, as law regularly implies intent from con-
duct. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 369
(1978). See also Wellens, supra note 38, at 32 (stating that even if uninten-
tional and incidental, the Security Council impacts the development of in-
ternational law).
193. For discussion of “legislative” resolutions of the Security Council, see
Peters, supra note 38, at 783; Stefan Talmon, The Security Council as World
Legislature, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 175, 176 (2005); THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS
GLOBAL LEGISLATOR (Vesselin Popovski & Trudy Fraser eds., 2014); Abi-Saab,
supra note 41, at 26–27; Tullio Treves, The Security Council as Legislator, in THE
DIVERSITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR KALLIOPI
K. KOUFA 61 (Aristotle Constantinides & Nikos Zaikos eds., 2009).
194. U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4950th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.4950 (Apr. 22,
2004); U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4950th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.4950 (Resump-
tion 1) (Apr. 22, 2004); U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4956th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc.
S/PV.4956 (Apr. 28, 2004).
195. S.C. Res. 2118 (Sept. 27, 2013); see discussion of this resolution,
supra Section III.B.4.
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cil’s thematic resolutions.196 Although thematic resolutions
are not formally binding, they present a legal opinion regard-
ing any existing obligations that attach to the CNEs involved.
For example, the intensification of the recruitment and use of
child soldiers by states and nonstate armed groups and the
growing public outrage over that practice have prompted the
Council to begin to specifically mention CNEs in the thematic
resolutions on “Children and Armed Conflict”.197 The Council
has “demand[ed] that all relevant parties” cease violations of
applicable international law against children and take special
measures to protect them.198 The resolutions articulated in-
creasingly concrete provisions to protect children and estab-
lished a unique monitoring, reporting, and engagement
mechanism.199
Several interrelated factors have enabled the develop-
ment of the Security Council’s practice of directly regulating
CNEs. First, the political dynamics within the Security Council
changed with the end of the Cold War, unblocking its deci-
sion-making processes. Second, the Security Council re-
sponded to the changed aspirations for world governance that
emerged after the Cold War in the broader international com-
munity. These aspirations have led to redefining the notion of
peace and strengthening commitment to various humanita-
rian, environmental, and human rights values.200 Third, the
nature of security threats has changed to increasingly encom-
pass activities of CNEs.201 Finally, Security Council practice has
196. Thematic resolutions are adopted in the context of the Security
Council’s thematic debates. These resolutions deal with generic issues as op-
posed to specific situations. For a list of the thematic issues on the Council’s
agenda, see Thematic Issues, UNITED NATIONS SEC. COUNCIL, https://
www.un.org/securitycouncil///items [https://perma.cc/6F95-RKFV] (last
visited Nov. 13, 2020).
197. S.C. Res. 1261 (Aug. 30, 1999); S.C. Res. 1314 (Aug. 11, 2000); S.C.
Res. 1379 (Nov. 20, 2001); S.C. Res. 1460 (Jan. 30, 2003); S.C. Res. 2143
(Mar. 7, 2014); S.C. Res. 2225 (June 18, 2015).
198. S.C. Res. 2068, ¶ 2 (Sept. 19, 2012); S.C. Res. 2143, ¶ 1 (Mar. 7,
2014); S.C. Res. 2225, ¶ 1 (June 18, 2015).
199. S.C. Res. 1612 (July 26, 2005).
200. See U.N. President of the S.C., supra note 38, at 2. See also supra Sec-
tion III.A.
201. Jacob Katz Cogan has suggested that the Security Council has in fact
been “[i]ncreasingly engaged in the protection of states from nonstate ac-
tors.” Although he includes both individual and CNEs within his definition
of “nonstate actors”, his analysis primarily focuses on individuals. Jacob Katz
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materialized against the backdrop of a growing sense that no
entity is a priori excluded from international law.202
Admittedly, analyzing Security Council action is challeng-
ing because most of the Council’s discussions and key negotia-
tions take place during informal meetings and consultations,
and no public record is available.203 Still, Security Council acts
and public meeting records suggest that the Council will in-
clude a CNE among the direct addressees of its resolutions
only when its members conclude, on the basis of a factual as-
sessment of the situation on the ground, that (i) the conduct
of a particular CNE specifically challenges international peace
and security, and (ii) the entity either prevents or is indispen-
sable for the attainment of a specific objective that the Council
pursues in the maintenance of international peace and secur-
ity, such as the containment of a humanitarian catastrophe or
nonproliferation of chemical weapons or protection of cul-
tural property. If these factors are met, the Security Council
may then (i) explicitly prescribe a new obligation or right for
the CNE; (ii) specify a preexisting obligation which may or
may not have been previously declared as specifically applica-
ble to CNEs; (iii) elaborate a previously applied general obli-
gation, such as compliance with international humanitarian
law, into obligations of specific conduct, such as prohibitions
on attacks against civilians, indiscriminate employment of
weapons in populated areas, and shelling and aerial bombard-
ment; (iv) clarify or transform its earlier request for a CNE to
act or cease to act into an unequivocal legal obligation; and (v)
demand a CNE’s compliance with stipulated obligations or im-
Cogan, Stabilization and the Expanding Scope of the Security Council’s Work, 109
AM. J. INT’L L. 324, 324 (2015).
202. See CRAWFORD, supra note 19, at 5 (elaborating the notion of contem-
porary international law as an open system); ROLAND PORTMANN, LEGAL PER-
SONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 276 (2010) (articulating a contemporary
conception of international law as an open system from which no entities are
a priori excluded).
203. The Security Council public meeting records regularly refer to “the
understanding reaching in its prior consultations.” See, e.g., the records relat-
ing to the Security Council’s early engagement with UNITA. U.N. SCOR,
45th Sess., 2991st mtg, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2991 (May 30, 1991); U.N. SCOR,
47th Sess., 3232d mtg, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3232 (June 8, 1993). On the Security
Council proceedings and working methods, see generally LORAINE SIEVERS &
SAM DAWS, THE PROCEDURE OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, 19–109 (4th ed.
2014).
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plement other enforcement measures. In so doing, the Secur-
ity Council responds to the needs identified in the particular
situation, using factual analysis to guide its choice of measures,
including escalating or discontinuing action vis-à-vis the CNE.
If the Security Council and the permanent members are pre-
pared to act in the matter at all, this choice would seem un-
constrained by the political dynamics among the Security
Council members.204
B. The Concept of the Functional Threshold
Examination of Security Council practice suggests that
the Council treats CNEs as addressees of binding international
law when its members consider that the function of the Char-
ter regime205 of providing a suitable normative framework for
the maintenance of international peace and security requires
the normative inclusion of certain CNEs within binding inter-
national law.206 In response to a matter affecting international
peace and security, a political consensus develops within the
Security Council that the maintenance of international peace
and security requires the international legal framework to ap-
ply directly to certain CNEs, such as an armed group, a politi-
cal opposition group, or a humanitarian organization, in addi-
tion to states. The Security Council thus incorporates particular
CNEs within international law’s system of coordination to ful-
fill the Charter regime’s function.
Certain CNEs are considered indispensable for the per-
formance of the Charter regime’s function. These functionally
204. Consider the process of the Security Council’s involvement in the
Syrian conflict discussed supra Part III.B.4. See also supra note 115 and accom-
panying text in relation to Kosovo.
205. The term “regime” is used here simply to refer to a set of rules which
relate to the same subject-matter. As such, the term does not refer to the
regime theories developed in the field of international relations, such as in
Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer & Volker Rittberger, Integrating Theories of
International Regimes, 26 REV. OF INT’L STUDIES 3 (2000).
206. References to positions and intentions of states are meant neither to
objectify the ascertainment of these positions and intentions, nor to suggest
mono-causality in social and political processes. However, governments ulti-
mately arrive at particular positions through their internal procedures,
which they then present externally and reflect in their diplomatic affairs. A
form of (careful) reductionism with respect to the interactions and factors
involved in states’ judgments therefore seems justified to facilitate any dis-
cussion.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYI\53-1\NYI102.txt unknown Seq: 50 30-DEC-20 13:03
120 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 53:71
critical entities either disrupt or facilitate the regime’s func-
tion, and Security Council members have adjusted the content
of existing law to account for the entities’ relevant capacities,
all from the perspective of the maintenance of international
peace and security.207
The centrality of the notion of function indicates that the
selective normative inclusion of CNEs among addressees of
binding international law in Security Council practice may be
characterized as involving the operation of a functional thresh-
old.208 This concept describes an observed trigger for the crea-
tion of international rules that address certain rights and obli-
gations directly to specific CNEs. Additionally, the functional
threshold effectively operates as a normative threshold for
CNEs’ relevance to international law’s regulatory purposes:
the point at which certain entities become addressees of inter-
national legal rights and obligations. Although the concept
does not claim or aspire to encompass every single instance of
practice in matters of international concern involving CNEs,
207. CNEs’ capacities can be defined in positive or negative terms. See, e.g.,
S.C. Res. 2249, ¶ 1 (Nov 20, 2015) (“[N]otes that [ISIL] has the capability and
intention to carry out further attacks and regards all such acts of terrorism as
a threat to peace and security . . .”); S.C. Res. 788, ¶ 12 (Nov. 19, 1992)
(“Commends the efforts of Member States, the United Nations system and
humanitarian organizations in providing humanitarian assistance to the vic-
tims of the conflict in Liberia, and in this regard reaffirms its support for
increased humanitarian assistance . . .”).
208. The term functional threshold here makes no reference to the func-
tionalist theory in international relations nor to the “functional vocabu-
laries” of “managerialism” described by Koskenniemi. ERNST HAAS, BEYOND
THE NATION-STATE: FUNCTIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
(1964) (theorizing international integration through the framework of func-
tionalism and the example of International Labour Organization); Martti
Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law – 20 Years Later, 20 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 7 (2009). As such, this article makes no claims about an ongoing process
of global integration, or its inevitability or preferability, as the international
relations theory of functionalism might posit. The theoretical framework
also entails no assumptions about the rationality of states in the construction
of legal regimes’ purposes and specific regulatory objectives, nor in the in-
troduction of direct rights and obligations for CNEs as rationalist and behav-
ioral economic approaches would do. See, e.g. LAUGE N. SKOVGAARD POULSEN,
BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY: THE POLITICS OF INVEST-
MENT TREATIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 25–46 (2015) (analyzing the
proliferation of bilateral investment treaties with reference to rationalist and
behavioral economics).
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the functional threshold delineates a discernible pattern in
the practice of states.
The functional threshold is not exclusive to the law of in-
ternational peace and security. The aspiration to provide a
suitable normative framework for the fulfilment of a legal re-
gime’s purpose has fueled the introduction of rights and obli-
gations for CNEs in areas as diverse as the UNCLOS deep sea-
bed regime; international aviation law; liability for environ-
mental harm; international humanitarian law, particularly the
laws on protection of victims of armed conflict and protection
of cultural property; weapons law, such as the law on conven-
tional weapons; human rights law; and international invest-
ment law.209
Some theoretical approaches have posited that the gen-
eral function of international law is to “safeguard international
peace, security and justice,”210 “maximize the common
good,”211 or “tell stories . . . of freedom, equality, and univer-
sality.”212 The function of international legal rules in relation
to a particular regulatory purpose may also be found in the
treaty law concept of “object and purpose,” which the VCLT
employs both as an independent substantive standard for as-
sessing the legality of state behavior in relation to a treaty213
209. Klara Polackova Van der Ploeg, Collective Non-State Entities in Inter-
national Law (Aug. 15, 2018) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Graduate In-
stitute of International and Development Studies) (on file with the Graduate
Institute of International and Development Studies Library); supra notes
6–15 and accompanying text.
210. Christian Tomuschat, International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Man-
kind on the Eve of a New Century: General Course on Public International Law, 281
RECUEIL DES COURS 23 (1999).
211. HIGGINS, supra note 28, at 1.
212. Martti Koskenniemi, Constitutionalism, Managerialism and the Ethos of
Legal Education, 1 EUR. J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 21 (2007). Other authors have been
highly critical of these efforts, arguing either that one cannot identify a sin-
gular function of law or that a generally formulated singular function lacks
the specificity necessary for resolution of specific issues and interpretative
controversies. Gunther Teubner, Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World
Society, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3, 13–14 (G. Teubner ed., 1997);
Philip Allott, The True Function of Law in the International Community, 5 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 391 (1998); Martti Koskenniemi, What is International
Law For?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 29, 29–31 (M. Evans ed., 2014).
213. VCLT supra note 66, arts. 18, 19, 41, 58.
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and as a component of treaty interpretation methodology.214
However, in the concept of the functional threshold, the no-
tion of function relates to the particular political consensus on
the normative arrangement required within an international
legal regime to deal with a matter of international concern in-
volving CNEs.
The performance of a legal regime’s function takes place
through specific regulatory objectives, which elaborate on and
implement the regime’s overall purpose. For example, under
the U.N. Charter regime, the specific regulatory objective of
providing humanitarian assistance to victims of a particular
armed group narrows the focus of the maintenance of peace
and security to the necessary normative arrangements. While a
regime’s overall purpose and the specific regulatory objectives
may be explicit or implicit, and their precise content may be
the subject of debate or change over time, they are always pre-
sent. Their understanding gives direction to the whole legal
regime and guides the particular normative arrangements, in-
cluding any political consensus on the incorporation of CNEs
directly in international law as a system of coordination.
International legal regimes, such as the U.N. Charter re-
gime for international peace and security, the deep seabed re-
gime, the nuclear civil liability regime, human rights protec-
tion, and the law on weapons, essentially represent normative
responses to matters of international concern. In the case of
the Security Council and the U.N. Charter regime, states have
developed a shared understanding that certain matters of in-
ternational peace and security prominently featuring CNEs
cannot be adequately addressed through harmonized domes-
tic laws or exclusively state-addressed international law. As
such, they have begun to treat these entities as addressees of
binding international law.
214. Id. arts. 31, 33. For discussion of the concept of “object and purpose,”
see generally, Jan Klabbers, Treaties, Object and Purpose, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLO-
PEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶¶ 6–7, 10–11, 14–16 (2006) (online
encyclopedia), https://opil.ouplaw/com/view/10.1093/law:epil/
9780199231690/law-9780199231690-
el681?rskey=NuU7MW&result=1&prd=MPIL; ANTHONY AUST, MODERN
TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 137 (2d ed. 2007); Dino Kritsiotis, The Object and
Purpose of a Treaty’s Object and Purpose, in CONCEPTUAL AND CONTEXTUAL PER-
SPECTIVES ON THE MODERN LAW OF TREATIES 237 (Michael Bowman & Dino
Kritsiotis eds., 2018).
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The perceived urgency of the legal regime’s function
takes precedence over the normative rigidity of existing inter-
national law categories, which strongly favor states and state-
based structures, as well as states’ inherent disinclination to
introduce direct international regulation of CNEs. States gen-
erally resist the normative inclusion of CNEs among addresses
of binding international law due to concerns about their own
conceptual and factual dominance within the international le-
gal order. The direct regulation of CNEs has been suggested
to infringe on states’ prerogatives in the international domain
and question the capacities of states and adequacy of purely
interstate, state-addressed regulation.215 The direct regulation
of CNEs also challenges states’ sovereignty by removing the en-
tities concerned from individual states’ domaine reservé, and
thus from their immediate and exclusive control. Most worry-
ing for some, this direct regulation is often mistakenly thought
to render CNEs “subjects of international law,” implying their
equality to and independence from states.216 Nevertheless, in
the case of the Security Council, states have set forth direct
rights and obligations for CNEs to more efficiently maintain
international peace and security.
Law can only adequately fulfil its regulatory role “if it ap-
plies effectively to the forms of social organization which in
practice control them.”217 The concept of the functional
215. See, e.g., Joel Delbrück, The Changing Role of the State in the Globalising
World Economy, in MAKING TRANSNATIONAL LAW WORK IN THE GLOBAL ECON-
OMY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF DETLEV VAGTS 56, 69 (P. Bekker et al. eds., 2010)
(arguing that “the State is caught up in a multi-layered system of govern-
ance, with partly competing and partly cooperating entities vested with pub-
lic authority and decision-making power . . . [and] has had to expose itself to
the ensuing normative and de facto impacts on its domestic sphere”); Menno
Kamminga, The Evolving Status of NGOs under International Law: A Threat to the
Inter-State System?, in STATE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE
387, 388 (Gerard Kreijen et al. eds., 2002) (noting concerns of critics that
“the influence of NGOs on the international plane has been growing out of
all proportion, that special interest groups cannot be expected to balance all
relevant interests, [and] that only States can be relied upon to do so . . .”).
216. Kamminga, supra note 215; Jose Alvarez, Are Corporations Subjects of
International Law?, 9 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L. L. 1, 3 (2011).
217. C. Wilfred Jenks, Multinational Entities in the Law of Nations, in TRANS-
NATIONAL LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF PHILIP C. JESSUP
70, 72 (Wolfgang Friedmann, Louis Henkin & Oliver Lissitzyn eds., 1972).
Cf. Jochen Abr. Frowein, Discussion, in NON-STATE ACTORS AS NEW SUBJECTS
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: INTERNATIONAL LAW—FROM THE TRADITIONAL STATE
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threshold elaborates on this general proposition by magnify-
ing the link between the normative inclusion of CNEs among
addressees of binding international law and the notion of a
legal regime’s function. Direct rights and obligations of CNEs
only develop when states consider particular entities indispen-
sable to providing the normative framework necessary to fulfill
a legal regime’s purpose. It is this link that explains which enti-
ties will acquire which rights and obligations in which circum-
stances. The functional threshold thus clarifies that an entity’s
international legal relevance is established in reference to the
function of a particular legal regime, rather than in reference
to some abstract power of the entity within the international
system. At the same time, the concept of the functional thresh-
old makes it clear that the normative inclusion of CNEs among
addressees of binding international law occurs within the con-
text of a specific legal regime. The incorporation of CNEs in
binding international law has thus not occurred on the macro
level of general or common international law, but rather
through the mezzo level of specialized legal regimes, such as
the U.N. Charter regime of international peace and secur-
ity.218
C. Contingency of the Normative Inclusion
The direct regulation of CNEs takes place through com-
plex political processes of interaction and interest formula-
tion, both at the international level and within states’ internal
political processes. The understanding of what normative ar-
rangement is required is fundamentally contingent on these
processes and is a product of the discourse developed within
the particular area of international law. The resulting practice
is thus dependent both on objective factors, such as the nature
of the matter of international concern and the conduct of par-
ORDER TOWARDS THE LAW OF THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY 59 (Rainer Hofmann
& Nils Geissler eds., 1999) (arguing that wherever power is being exercised
states will treat powerholders as important in international law and, under
certain circumstances, will take up international legal relations with them
without recognizing them as states).
218. International law may be described as a normative structure involving
three regulatory planes of different scope: (i) a micro level of individual
norms of international law, (ii) a mezzo level of specialized regimes of inter-
national law, and (iii) a macro level of general or common international law.
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ticular CNEs involved, and on the subjective positions, inter-
ests, agendas, and interactions of states.
Within the Security Council, the subjective element has
shaped all relevant factors involved: (i) the understanding of
the Charter regime’s purpose and specific regulatory objec-
tives, (ii) the characterization of particular CNEs as function-
ally critical, and (iii) the determination of what particular
right or obligation should be conferred on the functionally
critical entity.219 Ultimately, it is the narratives surrounding a
matter of international concern involving CNEs and the ensu-
ing positions of states, rather than notions of perfect rational-
ity,220 that guide individual acts of state practice and explain
the choice between different normative arrangements. CNEs
themselves, though lacking formal lawmaking authority in in-
ternational law conceptualized as state-made law, may be para-
mount in the particular discourse and shared understanding
that CNEs need to be directly regulated in binding interna-
tional law. For example, CNEs have participated in the Secur-
ity Council’s formal meeting debates,221 Arria-formula meet-
ings,222 and visiting missions.223
219. In the Security Council context, further complexity and variance
arise from different states acting as penholders on particular issues, and indi-
vidual items on the Security Council’s agenda involving different groups of
friends. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
220. Indeed, normative arrangements need not be rational solutions to
strategically defined problems. Whether specific normative arrangements
are actually rational or appropriate under particular models of rationality or
based on accurate underlying assumptions is irrelevant from the perspective
of legal normativity (although over time, any disparity in the expected out-
come may lead to the change of law).
221. CNEs participate in Security Council meetings when invited by the
Council. U.N., Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, Rule
39, U.N. Doc. S/96/Rev.7, U.N. Sales No. E.83.I.4 (1983); U.N. President of
the S.C., Note by the President of the Security Council, ¶ 50, U.N. Doc. S/
2006/507 (July 19, 2006); U.N. President of the S.C., Note by the President
of the Security Council, ¶ 59, U.N. Doc. S/2010/507 (July 26, 2010); U.N.
President of the S.C., Note by the President of the Security Council, ¶ 92,
U.N. Doc. S/2017/507 (Aug. 30, 2017). The participation of NGOs in the
Security Council open debates is widespread.
222. E.g., U.N. President of the S.C., Note by the President of the Security
Council, ¶ 54, U.N. Doc. S/2006/507 (July 19, 2006); U.N. President of the
S.C., Note by the President of the Security Council, ¶ 98, U.N. Doc. S/2017/
507 (Aug. 30, 2017). Amnesty International has been invited to Arria-
formula meetings on at least 20 occasions. Arria-formula meetings have also
hosted, for example, Burundi opposition parties ‘FRODEBU’ and
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The understanding of a regime’s purpose and specific
regulatory objectives, the tools necessary for the realization of
that purpose and objectives, and the determination of which
CNEs, if any, are functionally critical within the legal regime, is
not fixed and may be reinterpreted over time. The changed
idea of what constitutes a threat to international peace and
security shifted the conception of which issues and social rela-
tionships concern international peace and security. It also al-
tered the understanding of what the Charter regime’s purpose
of maintaining international peace and security involves, as
well as what normative means are necessary for the legal re-
gime’s function, including whether the normative inclusion of
particular CNEs within binding international law is required.
Accordingly, the concept of the functional threshold does
not suggest inevitability in the development of direct rights
and obligations of CNEs in international law, but rather em-
phasizes an element of contingency in that course of action.
For the same reason, the functional threshold cannot unfail-
ingly predict when direct regulation will take place. Nonethe-
less, there is a greater likelihood that states will treat a CNE as
directly possessing international rights and obligations under a
particular legal regime if certain factors are present. In the Se-
curity Council context, CNEs may pass the threshold and be
considered functionally critical on account of their construc-
tive or disruptive capacity to interfere with international peace
and security. Whether CNEs constitute a danger or a helpful
presence, they will be deemed functionally critical when states
recognize the entities’ political, technical, legitimizing, or
‘UPRONA’, represented by Parliamentarians for Global Action; Polisario;
Crimean Tatar National Movement; Syrian National Coalition; and other in-
ternational NGOs, such as CARE International, Médecins Sans Frontières
and Oxfam. SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT, ARRIA-FORMULA MEETINGS (Oct. 16,
2019), https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf//%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-
4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/_methods__.pdf [https://perma.cc/EV63-
TQZJ]; SIEVERS & DAWS, supra note 213, at 91.
223. U.N. President of the S.C., Note by the President of the Security
Council, ¶ 55, U.N. Doc. S/2006/507 (July 19, 2006); U.N. President of the
S.C., Note by the President of the Security Council, ¶ 68, U.N. Doc. S/2010/
507 (July 26, 2010); U.N. President of the S.C., Note by the President of the
Security Council, ¶ 123, U.N. Doc. S/2017/507 (Aug. 30, 2017); SECURITY
COUNCIL REPORT, SECURITY COUNCIL VISITING MISSIONS (Aug. 2, 2019),
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-security-council-working-meth-
ods/visiting-mission.php [https://perma.cc/Q5HJ-9VHL].
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other capacities in the maintenance of international peace
and security and therefore desire such entities’ cooperation.
D. Adaptation of International Law
Although the concept of the functional threshold encap-
sulates the existence of a normative threshold for the inclusion
of CNEs among addressees of binding international law, the
concept is descriptive, not normative. As a matter of positive
law, the operation of the functional threshold—at least in its
present configuration—does not suggest that international law
has developed to prescribe that states should confer certain di-
rect rights and obligations on certain CNEs. Accordingly, this
article does not argue that direct regulation of CNEs should
take place in certain or all circumstances.
Fundamentally, the concept of the functional threshold
captures a mechanism through which states have adapted in-
ternational law to the changing character of international
law’s social body and of the social phenomena underpinning
matters of international concern—in particular, the promi-
nence of CNEs and consequent shifts in significant conduct
and key relationships. Because international law is shaped by
its underlying social reality,224 the inclusion of CNEs among
addressees of binding international law has developed in state
practice as a normative response to the changes in this social
reality.
Historically, international law could adequately regulate
international life through states, which could channel and
control collective conduct within their jurisdiction, including
any international effects of that conduct. The majority of
human conduct was limited to the territory of an individual
state, and states dominated both domestically and internation-
ally in economic, political and social terms. However, human
activities, resources, wealth, and their impact, are no longer
confined to the territory of individual states. Global social
structures have transformed to account for the growing inter-
dependencies of states and human communities, greater trans-
border cooperation, disassociation of economic power from
fixed territory, delocalization of global elites, extraterritorial
224. Bianchi, supra note 31, at 393; ANDREW CLAPHAM, BRIERLY’S LAW OF
NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN INTERNA-
TIONAL RELATIONS 41 (7th ed. 2012).
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exercises of public authority, increased private self-regulation,
and the transfer of public tasks to nongovernmental and su-
pranational organizations.225 Saskia Sassen has described how
economic globalization transformed the territorial organiza-
tion of economic activity and politico-economic power: The
contemporary economic system centered on cross-border
flows and global telecommunications has produced a “new ge-
ography of power,” which affects states’ sovereignty and exclu-
sive territoriality.226 These shifts have not been limited to the
economic sphere; they may also be observed in other areas,
including security, the environment, and health. As a conse-
quence, various CNEs regularly vitally affect the operation of
the international system and matters of international concern.
States have frequently been unable to respond to or to exer-
cise the requisite level of control over the conduct of these
entities, and the traditional interstate mechanisms have often
proved ineffective.227
The Security Council has adapted the Charter regime in
response to shifts in the social structures underlying matters of
international peace and security. The end of the Cold War
brought with it new security threats and a focus on nonstate
entities, as non-international armed conflicts became preva-
lent; cross-border operations of armed groups and terrorist or-
ganizations intensified; and widespread nonstate violence
against humanitarian agencies took place.228 At the same time,
the era also witnessed greater participation of CNEs in deliver-
225. See generally, Delbrück, supra note 215 (examining the ability of to-
day’s state to act “as the main regulatory actor in the world economy” and
comparing the role of states in a globalized environment with that of classic
territorial states).
226. SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL?: SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF GLOBAL-
IZATION 1–32 (1996). See also Enrico Milano, The Deterritorialization of Interna-
tional Law, 2 ESIL REFLECTIONS, no. 3, at 2 (discussing “the extent to which
international law has been affected by and has contributed to new forms of
power exercise detached from territory”).
227. For discussion, see Jacob Katz Cogan, The Regulatory Turn in Interna-
tional law, 52 HARV. INT’L. L. J. 322, 344 (2011); De Jonge, supra note 198, at
73; Delbrück, supra note 215, at 61, 68; Jost Delbrück, Prospects for a “World
(Internal) Law”?: Legal Developments in a Changing International System, 9 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 401, 410 (2002); BOYLE & CHINKIN, supra note 23, at 21;
Michael Reisman, Designing and Managing the Future of the State, 8 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 409 (2007); Christoph Schreuer, The Waning of the Sovereign State:
Towards a New Paradigm for International-Law?, 4 EUR. J. INT’L L. 447 (1993).
228. Wellens, supra note 38.
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ing humanitarian assistance worldwide.229 These factors were
accompanied by a number of theoretical shifts, including the
redefinition of the notions of peace and security, a less strict
interpretation of the principle of noninterference in internal
affairs, prioritization of humanitarian and communitarian val-
ues, overall normative opening of international law to non-
state phenomena, and a belief in international law as a tool for
international peace and security. The period also broadly coin-
cided with a new intensity in globalization.
The changes in the social structures underpinning mat-
ters of international peace and security have redefined the rel-
evant conduct and relationships that the Charter regime seeks
to regulate. These transformations have consequently created
tension between the norms and structures of international law
and the newly significant conduct of CNEs. The functional
threshold has arisen in state practice as a response to this ten-
sion; it operates as a normative vehicle to process shifts in in-
ternational society and adapt international law to its underly-
ing social reality.230 The Security Council has adapted the pre-
vious exclusively state-addressed regime to incorporate and
regulate CNEs significantly involved in matters of interna-
tional peace and security within the binding normative frame-
work. The concept of the functional threshold encapsulates
this adaptation.
By imposing at least some constraints and regularity on
CNEs’ conduct, states seek to stabilize interactions and rela-
tionships within the international domain. At the same time,
direct regulation enables international law to retain its value as
a tool for the normative structuring of such interactions and
relationships. As Niklas Luhmann explained in his theory of
autopoiesis, social conduct does not exist in law unless a legal
229. Pamela Aall, Nongovernmental Organizations and Peacemaking, in MAN-
AGING GLOBAL CHAOS: SOURCES OF AND RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL CON-
FLICT 433–34 (Chester Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, & Pamela Aall eds.,
1996).
230. For discussion, see Van der Ploeg, supra note 209, at 48–57. See also
Bianchi, supra note 31, at 394 (discussing the unsatisfactory theoretical ac-
count of the role played by nonstate actors in contemporary international
law and arguing that an acknowledgement of the changing social structure
of the international community and new conceptual tools are required).
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norm confers legal meaning on such conduct.231 The norma-
tive inclusion of CNEs among addressees of binding interna-
tional law confers legal meaning on the conduct of entities
falling within the scope of the pertinent rules, making such
conduct legally cognizable within international law. The adap-
tation of international law through the functional threshold to
place CNEs directly within international law’s purview thus en-
ables international law to continue to structure key conduct
and relationships in the international domain.
V. CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS OF THE
FUNCTIONAL THRESHOLD
Although international lawyers have long reported on the
diversification of entities in the international domain and the
related new normative phenomena, international legal doc-
trine has remained uncomfortable with the proposition that
CNEs may possess rights and obligations directly under inter-
national law without the interposition of any state. The general
impression continues to be that the “legal status” of such enti-
ties in international law is “less clear and less extensive.”232
The International Law Association’s Study Group on Non-
State Actors, active from 2007 to 2016, has not brought much
clarity. The Study Group was tasked to “examine the position
of non-state actors in international law in terms of their rights
and obligations.”233 Although the Study Group generated four
231. Niklas Luhmann, The Autopoiesis of Social Systems, in SOCIOCYBERNETIC
PARADOXES: OBSERVATION, CONTROL, AND EVOLUTION OF SELF-STEERING SYS-
TEMS 172, 172–92 (Felix Greyer & Johannes van der Zouwen eds., 1986);
Niklas Luhmann, Operational Closure and Structural Coupling: The Differentia-
tion of the Legal System, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1419–41 (1992). See also Vera
Gowlland-Debbas, The Security Council and Issues of Responsibility under Interna-
tional Law, 353 RECUEIL DES COURS 185, 204–05 (2012) (applying Luhmann’s
theory to international law); Robert Jennings, Nullity and Effectiveness in Inter-
national Law, in 2 COLLECTED WRITINGS OF SIR ROBERT JENNINGS 694 (1998)
(discussing legally “nonexistent” acts from the perspective of nullity).
232. JAN KLABBERS, INTERNATIONAL LAW 95–96 (2d ed., 2017).
233. Int’l. L. Ass’n., Proposal to establish an ILA Committee for the Study
of the Rights and Obligations of Non-State Actors Under International Law
(2007), https://perma.cc/9UXZ-GZJA. The Study Group’s definition of
“non-state actors” is similar, though not identical to that of CNEs, as it ex-
pressly excluded “illegal bodies” such as Al Qaeda. First Report of the Commit-
tee—Non-State Actors in International Law: Aims, Approach and Scope of Project
and Legal Issues, supra note 11, at 6–7.
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official reports234 and a substantial publication output,235 its
actual results were rather mixed.236
The foregoing analysis demonstrates how international
law has responded to changes in the global social order, in-
cluding changed power structures and the resulting promi-
nence of various CNEs. Specifically, the article traces how the
Security Council has developed the UN Charter regime of in-
ternational peace and security to confer rights and impose ob-
ligations directly upon CNEs, thereby including such entities
within its purview and regulating their conduct—including
their relationships with states—directly. Moreover, the law of
international peace and security and U.N. Security Council
practice is but one example of increasingly widespread norma-
tive inclusion and regulation of CNEs under binding interna-
tional law. CNEs operate within contemporary international
law in a manner that clashes with the role assigned to them
under classical international law; the exclusionary doctrinal
narrative does not correspond to actual practice.
The concept of the functional threshold captures the par-
ticular dynamic involved in the treatment of CNEs as address-
ees of binding international law and the centrality of the func-
tion of a legal regime as a normative framework. The Security
Council has adapted the Charter regime to incorporate CNEs
directly within binding international law to ensure that the re-
gime continues to maintain international peace and security.
234. See First Report of the Committee—Non-State Actors in International Law:
Aims, Approach and Scope of Project and Legal Issues, supra note 233; Interna-
tional Law Association: The Sofia Conference (2012), Second Report of the
Committee—Non-State Actors in International Law: Lawmaking and Participation
Rights; Third Report Prepared by the Co-Rapporteurs, Cedric Ryngaert and Jean
d’Aspremont supra note 9; International Law Association: The Johannesburg
Conference (2016), Final Report.
235. See generally NON-STATE ACTOR DYNAMICS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
FROM LAW-TAKERS TO LAW-MAKERS (Math Noortmann & Cedric Ryngaert
eds., 2010); RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NON-STATE ACTOR IN ARMED CONFLICT
AND THE MARKET PLACE: THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND EMPIRICAL FIND-
INGS (Noemi Gal-Or, Cedric Ryngaert & Math Noortmann eds., 2015).
236. The ILA adopted a resolution which, although formulated in a posi-
tive manner, effectively admits the Committee’s inability to draw substantive
conclusions from its work. Int’l. L. Ass’n. Res. 6/2016 (2016) (“Acknowledg-
ing the fact that the Committee has adopted a broad working definition of
non-state actors, and that it is not possible to draw general or particular con-
clusions . . . without more specific analysis of individual types of non-state
actor . . .”).
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Evolving understandings of what constitutes a security threat
or a matter of international peace and security have changed
what social conduct and relationships are considered signifi-
cant for the maintenance of international peace and security,
leading the Security Council to treat CNEs as addressees of
binding international law.
The parameters that characterize the phenomenon of
CNEs’ direct rights and obligations in the Security Council’s
practice refute some of the commonly held beliefs about the
supposed “risks” involved in direct regulation of CNEs
through binding international law. The analysis may conse-
quently inform the use of direct regulation of collective non-
state entities as a regulatory tool in other areas of international
law. For example, the observed differentiation of rights and
obligations of states and CNEs rebuts the concern that ad-
dressing rights and obligations to CNEs would equate such en-
tities with states, both in status and in the scope of the rights
and obligations. This, as a matter of principle and practice, is
not the case, as the rights and obligations of states and CNEs
are not identical, and states and CNEs are treated—and may
be treated as a matter of international law—in a differentiated
manner. Arguments that the formulation of obligations for
CNEs would weaken analogous obligations of states are also
unfounded. Security Council resolutions explicitly stipulate
obligations of CNEs alongside those of states, clarifying that
such obligations are separate and that states and CNEs owe
performance under the obligations independently. Therefore,
a policy decision to impose particular international legal obli-
gations, such as human rights obligations, only on states can-
not be defended on legal grounds, as parallel rights and obli-
gations of states and CNEs provide independent, self-standing,
and substantively complementary means to deal with matters
of international concern.
The transformation of the U.N. Charter regime of inter-
national peace and security and analogous developments in
other areas of international law demonstrate that the conven-
tional view that international law does not regulate the con-
duct of CNEs in a legally binding manner no longer holds.
The direct regulation of CNEs and the operation of the func-
tional threshold call into question many basic tenets and doc-
trines of international law, including, most prominently, the
doctrine of subjects and the default presumption that binding
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international law does not apply to CNEs. Even if the full im-
plications of the normative inclusion are only beginning to
emerge, one conclusion is clear: the mainstream doctrine on
CNEs in binding international law must change.
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